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1. INTRODUCTION
Among the most important functions we have afforded to the U.S.
Congress is the power to reshape social and economic incentive structures
through legislation. Proceeding from the enumerated powers under the
Constitution and using a complex toolbox of legislative and regulatory
innovations, the federal legislature has enormous power to transform the
types of behavior that people will perceive as self-interested throughout our
economy and thus how those same people are likely to act. Congress can,
among other things, create new forms of criminal and civil liability,
establish entitlement systems, subsidize industries, encourage behavior
through the tax code, regulate interactions among producers and
consumers, set market ground-rules, and limit the scope of permissible
activity.
As Congress uses these tools to alter incentives, new market
configurations emerge and interests shift, often in unanticipated ways.
Even minor changes in incentives can have enormously magnified effects
as parties respond to new rules and changed price signals. Given the
dynamic nature of our economy, legislation designed to target one problem
inevitably causes unexpected changes in other places. The "law of
unintended consequences," as Robert Merton phrased it,' is among the
primary reasons that legislation is and must remain a highly iterative
process, open always to improvement and reconfiguration in light of new
information. Doubtless some entities develop an interest in the
preservation of the status quo, but in a representative democracy, we would
expect that only those policies whose consequences correspond to the
demands of the broader public would remain in effect over time. The
system of corn subsidies provides an instructive, if not nightmarish,
example of the unintended consequences that legislated incentive structures
can produce when not regularly reevaluated and highlights the processes
that are preventing that reevaluation from taking place.
Initially created in the 1930s to stabilize agricultural prices during the
Great Depression, agricultural subsidies and price supports have since
turned food production markets upside down. These subsidies alter
incentives for corn growers, agricultural producers, processors, and the
manufacturers of countless corn-based products and produce ripple effects
throughout other sectors of the economy. Rather than aiding family
farmers, the subsidy system now in place primarily benefits large




commercial growers and gives farmers the incentive to grow more no
matter how much corn is already on the market. The secondary effects-
such as over-stimulating high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), ethanol, and
factory-farmed meat production-only scratch the surface of the Farm
Bill's impact. By paying large subsidies out of the U.S. tax base, Congress
is funding preventable environmental degradation, deepening our fossil-
fuel dependence, accelerating America's obesity and diabetes epidemics,
and contributing billions of dollars to annual healthcare costs.
Internationally, American subsidies have upset commodity prices, pushed
countless farmers out of work, fueled political instability, and even
promoted farm-labor immigration into the United States. In short, the U.S.
Farm Bill redraws markets and warps incentives far beyond the domestic
market in grain and corn. As Michael Pollan wrote regarding the bill, "the
nation's agricultural policies operate at cross-purposes with its public
health objectives." 2
Despite mounting political opposition, U.S. regulators and legislators
have proven unwilling to confront these externalities and continue to
actively fund Farm Bill after Farm Bill. The American citizenry continues
to bear the ultimate costs and risks associated with bad and politically
unassailable policies in the form of direct tax expenditures, increased
energy prices, skyrocketing obesity rates, higher healthcare costs, and
shorter lives, but that message has done little to alter the behavior of
elected representatives. Corn subsidies stand as a testament to the larger
failures of our legislative system and expose the difficulties that the U.S.
campaign finance and lobbying systems pose to maintaining a legitimate
public-private divide.
The persistence of America's burdensome agricultural policies can
only be properly understood when viewed in the context of the incentives
and structural constraints facing policymakers themselves. Congress and
the USDA also face incentives of their own, and the legislation they
produce reflects that fact. These incentives, however, have become
interlinked, through our lobbying and campaign finance systems, with the
very same private sector interests Congress is entrusted with regulating,
offering perhaps the most cogent explanation for why these harmful
policies remain in place. As long as incentives for legislators are linked
with those of narrowly-defined interest groups, the only institution capable
of recalibrating agricultural policy is likely to remain unwilling to address
the environmental and healthcare problems now confronting our country,
2. Michael Pollan, You Are What You Grow, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 22,
2007, available at http://michaelpollan.com/articles-archive/you-are-what-you-grow/.
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even those problems actively made worse through legislative decisions like
the corn subsidy. In the short-term, interest groups should respond to the
new political ecosystem, but eventually Congress must somehow come to
terms with its own corrosive conflicts of interest if policymaking is to
remain responsive to the needs of the voting public.
This article will depict the complex market-system that agricultural
policies-whether intentionally or not-have given rise to and then
describe how these policies produce effects that radiate throughout the
larger economy. This article then attempts to explain that this state-created
market-system has itself been shaped by the incentive structures of a
legislative system increasingly characterized by political gridlock,
fragmentation, and special interest money. While the primary focus of this
article is on corn subsidies, it is not meant as a criticism of corn subsidies
per se or even agricultural subsidies generally. Rather, the two problems
this article aspires to highlight are: 1) that subsidies are reproduced with
little understanding of their systemic impact beyond the agricultural
system; and 2) that because of the particular way the American legislative
process currently operates, there are few incentives for legislators to even
articulate a coherent food policy or agricultural policy that might justify
such spending decisions.
Part II of the article provides a brief historical account of corn
subsidies and related agricultural regulations. Part III examines the current
administration of federal corn subsidies; the incentives that subsidies create
for corn growers, food producers, manufacturers, and consumers; and
several salient healthcare and environmental costs these subsidies have
imposed. Part IV examines those features of our federal political landscape
that make effective legislation and regulation in this area such a formidable
challenge. Finally, this article concludes with the observation that restoring
reasonable price signals in our food system will require us to move away
from deficiency payment systems-and that getting there will require us to
confront deeper structural problems with the way agricultural legislation is
passed and implemented.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES AND RELATED
LEGISLATION
The current farm payment system in the United States is only
intelligible when viewed in its historical context. The history of agricultural
bills in the United States follows a pattern of large-scale, transformative
legislation passed in response to a national emergency, followed by
decades of drift, rent-seeking, and incremental adjustments. Federal
agricultural legislation has historically been concerned with three
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overarching objectives: 1) insulating grain markets from both market and
weather-related shocks; 2) protecting family farms; and 3) increasing
agricultural output. It is significant that the Farm Bill is only recently being
reexamined in light of its impact on the environment and domestic
healthcare costs. As in many areas of legislation, agricultural policy has
been characterized by "punctuated equilibrium," periods of rapid
transformation that are followed by periods of relative inactivity, 3 during
which time new stakeholders emerge who often seek, through mechanisms
described in Section IV, to protect their interests and resist transformative
legislation until another emergency forces change.4
This Part provides a brief overview of the major federal agricultural
legislation and subsidies programs, with particular attention given to the
social and political conditions that shaped these bills. It begins with an
early history of agricultural regulation and then describes the subsidy
system introduced during the New Deal and World War II. This Part
concludes with a short history of agricultural legislation since the late
1940s, when the multi-year Farm Bill emerged, and the federal response to
the 1970s Food Crisis, which gave rise to the modem subsidy system.
A. An Early History and the Recurring Themes ofAgricultural Regulation
Since America's founding, cries to preserve small family farms have
been a regular voice in national policy debates, often even in matters
extended beyond merely agricultural concerns. The independent and self-
sufficient farmer, connected to the land and informed by deep-rooted
traditions, is a persistent image of American identity and remains central to
a number of continuing ideological debates.5  The Jeffersonian agrarian
3. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Enron: Lessons and Implications: Punctuated
Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. &
Fin. 1, 1 (Autumn, 2002).
4. See generally Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breunig, Christoffer Green-
Pedersen, Bryan D. Jones, Peter B. Mortensen, Michiel Neytemans, and Stefaan
Walgrave, Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective. 53 AM. J. POL. Scl. 53,
3, (July 2009): 603 (discussing how punctuated equilibrium works in government
policy-making); Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, From There to Here:
Punctuated Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government
Information Processing, POL'Y STUDIES J. 40, 1 (Jan. 2012) (providing an overview of
punctuated equilibrium).
5. See, e.g., William Pike, Raw Milk and the Sour State: Control of the Milk Supply
is a Primary Step toward Government Control of the Larger Food Supply, 59 The
Freeman Ideas on Liberty 1 (Jan./Feb. 2009), available at http://www.the freeman
online.org/featured/raw-milk-and-the-sour-state/print ("One must ask if the many
citizen-farmers who valiantly fought for liberty two centuries ago could have ever
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republic invoked the starkly autonomous farmer, and Jefferson placed the
independent agrarian citizen at the center of his entire political ideology.
Into the nineteenth century, the image of the self-sufficient farmer helped
energize legislation such as the Homestead Act, which granted public lands
to settlers in order to increase the settlement of land outside the original
6thirteen colonies. Lincoln, in his final address to Congress, famously
referred to the USDA as "The People's Department."7  As in the
Congressional response to the Great Depression, protecting family farmers
was often one explicit justification for agricultural legislation. Even as
technological innovation and commercialization transformed farming into
an industrial practice, this rhetoric has retained political currency and
continues to frame agricultural debates.9
Early agricultural legislation focused on ways that scientific and
technological advancements could increase productivity and output. The
1862 creation of the USDA10 and the Morrill Land Grant College Act," for
instance, emphasized the adoption of new technological methods and
envisioned a "free" state in which one citizen would be legally barred from selling milk
from his cow to another citizen. Even King George III would have laughed at that
idea.").
6. DENNIS KEENEY, INST. FOR AGRIC AND TRADE POL'Y AND LONI KEMP, THE
MINNESOTA PROJECT, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE U.S. 6 (2003), available
at http://www.mnproject.org/publications/New%20Agricultural%2Policy%/o20for
%20the%20US.pdf.
7. News Release No. 0042.09, USDA, Vilsack Establishes the People's Garden
Project on Bicentennial of Lincoln's Birth: Announces goal of creating community
gardens at each USDA facility worldwide (Feb. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly-true&contentid=2009/
02/0042.xml.
8. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Agric, Nutrition, and Forestry, Crisis and Activism:
1929-1940, S. Doc. No. 105-24, (1998), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/senate agriculture/prelim.html.
9. See Stanley Fishman, Protect Family Farms! Save Food Freedom!, TENDER
GRASSFED MEAT (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.tendergrassfedmeat.com/2010/11/19/
protect-family-farms-save-food-freedom/; Thomas Richard Poole, Silly Rabbit, Farm
Subsidies Don't Help America, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 183 (Fall
2006).
10. National Agricultural Library, USDA, http://www.nal.usda.gov/lincolns-
agricultural-legacy.
11. See e.g. Marcus Brown (Frank Stanger, ed.), The Morrill Land-Grant Act of





sought "to support colleges of agriculture and mechanical arts."l2
Similarly, the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 formed an official partnership
between land-grant universities and the USDA, known as the National
Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA).13 This Act established a system
whereby land-grant universities received federal funds to invest in
agricultural education and extension work, while NIFA helped ensure those
funds were spent in accordance with USDA priorities.14  With the full
support of Congress and the USDA, technological advancements enabled
massive increases in productivity, leading to consolidation and larger farm
operations. Ironically, while public rhetoric surrounding agricultural policy
often invokes the family farmer,' 5 federal policy has proven unable to stave
off commercial farming and the decline of the family farm. 16 In fact, as
Brian Riedl of the conservative and libertarian Heritage Foundation
described in a New York Times online discussion, "[s]etting aside the
Norman Rockwell imagery, farm subsidies are America's largest corporate
welfare program."' 7
Another recurring objective of U.S. agricultural legislation has been
the need to insulate farmers and the food supply from excessive uncertainty
created by both seasonal weather fluctuations and economic instability.
During World War I, for instance, NIFA sought to address war-related farm
labor shortages by expanding the acreage used to grow wheat and
implementing new USDA production and food conservation policies.' 8
Following the war, in an effort to stabilize grain prices and prevent market
12. The Land-Grant Tradition, ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC AND LAND-GRANT
UNIVERSITIES (2012), http://www.aplu.org/document.doc?id=780.
13. History of Extension, USDA NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
(Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.csrees.usda.gov/qlinks/extension.html.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g. Chuck Hassebrook, Room for Debate, Cap the Subsidies to Big Farms,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/21/do-
farm-subsidies-protect-national-security/put-a-cap-on-subsides-to-big-farms. ("Many
Democrats who wrap themselves in rhetoric about saving the little guy are equally
timid when it comes to reigning in mega-farm subsidies.").
16. See Keeney, D. and L. Kemp. How to Make it Work: Required Policy
Transformations for Agroecosystem Restoration. Presented at the 89th Annual Meeting
of the Ecological Society of America, Portland, Oregon, 1-6 (August 2004).
17. Brian Riedl, Room for Debate, Who Eats Cotton Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/21/do-farm-subsidies-
protect-national-security/who-eats-cotton-anyway.
18. See History of Extension, supra note 15 ("The extension service's first big test
came during World War I, when it helped the nation meet its wartime needs by:
Increasing wheat acreage significantly, from an average of 47 million acres annually in
1913 to 74 million in 1919.").
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manipulation, Congress passed the 1922 Grain Futures Act 9, which placed
restrictions on exchanges in grain futures by establishing a regulated
exchange and created a number of disclosure requirements. 20 This Act was
later replaced by the Commodity Exchange Act, which regulates the
exchange of broader categories of commodities options and futures without
singling out agricultural commodities. 2 1 This rationale for regulating the
agricultural sector became particularly acute during the early 1930s, when
severe droughts and a prolonged economic recession threatened to disrupt
the food supply, put hundreds of thousands of farmers out of work, and
send grain prices spiraling out of control.
Of course, these themes represent only the public justifications given
for agricultural legislation and food subsidies and ring their most accurate
when viewed alongside the large-scale legislative responses to national
emergencies that were presented by the Great Depression and the Food
Crisis of the 1970s. Behind the scenes, another set of recurrent themes
drives agricultural legislation, and those themes have had more to do with
the needs and interests of incumbent industry groups and influential
agricultural business lobbies. The remainder of this Part describes the
major historical events that defined agricultural policy and the resultant
legislation. The mechanisms and pressure points through which lobbyists
and interest groups came to exert the influence they did is taken up more
fully in Part IV below.
B. Agricultural Policy through the Depression, the New Deal, and World
War II
The first large-scale direct subsidies were established as a response to
unstable economic conditions in the agricultural sector caused by the Great
Depression and the 1930s Dust Bowl. These payment programs were
meant to provide welfare-like support to farmers and to prevent food prices
from entering a deflationary spiral.2 2 Farmers were among those hardest hit
19. See The Grain Futures Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2010). The Act when originally
passed in 1922 was entitled "Commodity Exchange Act" but the title was amended in
1936 to "The Grain Futures Act." Id.
20. See History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the
Creation of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/historyprecftc.html; Investopedia
Financial Dictionary: Grain Futures Act of 1922, ANSWERS.COM,
http://www.answers.com/topic/grain-futures-act-of- 1922.
2 1. Id.
22. See CYNTHIA CLARK NORTHRUP, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 231 (2003) (describing the AAA as a "[g]overnment limitation on
VOL. 88
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by the depression, and at the time, over 20% of the American workforce
23was engaged in agricultural employment. 2 Under President Hoover,
Congress passed the Agriculture Marketing Act of 1929 and established the
Federal Farm Board, which was authorized to lend to farmers and to
purchase surplus crops in order to stabilize prices.24 Despite entrusting the
Federal Farm Board with a $500 million dollar fund to stabilize prices and
increase lending to the agricultural sector, this bill was unable to stop crop
prices from falling.25
As crop prices continued to fall though the early 1930s, farmers grew
additional crops to compensate for lost earnings, which led to further
surpluses and drove the price of crops lower still. Congress reacted by
passing two major agricultural bills as part of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's broader New Deal efforts to stabilize markets and stop this
downward price cycle.26 The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was
created in 193327 and authorized to buy, sell, lend, and make payments in
order "to stabilize, support, and protect farm income and prices."28
Congress also passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,29 which
created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) 30 and
agricultural production to raise price per unit and a primary policy tool designed to
stabilize agricultural commodity prices and thus farm income and closures.").
23. See Carolyn Dimitri, Anne Effland, and Neilson Conklin, The 20th Century
Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy, USDA ERS, ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION BULLETIN NUMBER 3 (June 2005), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications
/ElB3/eib3.pdf.
24. See generally R. B. Heflebower, Price Stabilization under the Farm Board, 12 J.
Farm Econ. 595 (Oct. 1930).
25. See Chapter 4: Crisis and Activism: 1929-1940, The United States Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1825 - 1998, Y 1.1/3:105-24, (Dec.
31, 1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC- 1 05sdoc24/html/
ch4.html.
26. See History of USDA's Farm Service Agency, USDA FARM SERVICE AGENCY
(Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject-landing&
topic=ham-ah.
27. About the Commodity Credit Corporation, USDA FARM SERVICE AGENCY (Aug.
20, 2008), http://www.apfo.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject-landing
&topic=sao-cc.
28. See S. REP. No. 111-221 (2009-2010); see also Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) Charter Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-806 (1948).
29. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933)
(originally cited as ch.25, 48 Stat. 31). Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA),
ENCYLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/9551/
Agricultural-Adjustment-Administration-AAA (last visited Jun. 18, 2012).
30. Agricultrual Adjustment Administration, supra note 29.
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established subsidies for farmers who left their land fallow.3 1  These
subsidies were designed to reduce crop surpluses and were paid for by
taxing companies that processed agricultural goods. 32 The 1933 Act also
created a system of land allotments, which, in conjunction with the 1935
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, worked to prevent over-
farming and to avoid crop surpluses. 3 The Supreme Court in 1936,
however, intervened and held that the taxation and redistribution scheme in
the Agricultural Adjustment Act was a usurpation of state powers in
violation of the Tenth Amendment. 34
Agricultural problems persisted, and public support mounted for some
type of agricultural support system. Following Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's 1937 court-packing plan and the famous "switch in time that
saved nine,",3 the Supreme Court began backing away from its opposition
to New Deal legislation. 6 In 1938, Congress successfully passed the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,37 which instituted the farm subsidy
policies first introduced in the 1933 legislation and opened the way for
subsequent Farm Bills. The 1933 legislation provided mandatory price
supports for corn, cotton, and wheat that would guarantee a baseline level
of production and keep supply levels in alignment with market demand.
The government accomplished this by making sure the price of a
commodity never deviated too far from its parity price relative to farmers'
expenses.39 In order to keep the price and supply levels at desired level, the
AAA was authorized under the 1938 Act to extend loans to farmers to grow
additional staple commodities, such as corn, during good years, which were
stored by the government and could then be released when yields were
31. History of Agricultural Price-Support and Adjustment Programs, 1933-84:
Background for 1985 Farm Legislation, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE,
AGRICULTURE INFORMATION BULLETIN NUMBER 485 (Dec. 1984),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/aib485/aib485.pdf [hereinafter History of
Agricultura Price-Support and Adjustment Programs].
32. See Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), supra note 29.
33. See History ofAgricultural Price-Support and Adjustment Programs, supra note
31, at 11.
34. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
35. Daniel Ho and Kevin Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, CELS 2009 4th
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/Ho.Quinn.Paper.pdf.
36. See generally id. (discussing the conflict between FDR and the Supreme Court
and how the Court shifted).
37. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
38. History ofAgricultural Price-Support and Adjustment Programs, supra note 31
at iv, 4.
39. See id. at 3-4 (explaining how parity prices were calculated).
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low. 40 The 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act remains part of the
permanent background law for commodity programs and farm income
supports, and would revert into effect if at any time a superseding bill is not
in effect. 4 1 Although it has since been superseded by subsequent
legislation, the 1938 Act continues to cast its shadow over the
administration of subsidies to the present.
C. The Rise of the Multi-year Omnibus Farm Bill
Farm policy in the post-war years focused on mitigating the harms of
rising rural poverty while trying to stop overproduction in the agricultural
sector that widespread poverty encouraged.4 2 These goals were achieved
through a combination of direct assistance programs, subsidies for farmers
who agreed to take land out of production, and by making credit more
readily available.43 The decades following World War II, however, were
characterized by the consolidation of smaller farms into larger, more
industrial operations,44 a fact that helps explain the origin of more
concentrated lobbying interests that emerged during this time. The other
major change in agricultural policy seen during the post-war period was the
multi-year Farm Bill, a policy that was meant to provide policy-makers
with opportunities to make regular, comprehensive changes to food and
agricultural policy,45 but instead provided more frequent intervals for
lobbyists to influence the legislation.
The Agricultural Act of 1949,46 in amended form, is known as the
permanent legislation, and like the 1938 Act and the 1948 Commodity
Credit Corporation Charter Act (CCCCA), remains part of the background
40. See G. V. L. PERKINS, CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE, 190 (1969). See also
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, INFO PLEASE (2007),
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/AO802770.html.
41. See JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21999, FARM COMMODITY
PROGRAMS AND THE 2007 FARM BILL (2007), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18789.pdf.




45. See RENIEE JOHNSON AND JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RS 22131, WHAT
IS THE FARM BILL? (2010), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs
/RS22131.pdf.
46. History of Agricultural Price-Support and Adjustment Programs, supra note 31
at iv. See also Agricultural Act of 1948, Pub.L. 80-897 (1948) and Agricultural Act of
1949, Pub.L. 89-349 (1949).
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agricultural law to the present day.47 The 1949 Act provided legal
authorization to the CCC to reallocate surplus foods, including corn and
other staples, to school lunch programs, poor Americans, and
internationally to friendly nations as development aid. 48 The CCC was
given corporate charter in 1948 and was authorized under the 1949 Act to
administer the USDA's farm price and income support commodity
programs and agricultural subsidies.49
Beginning in 1965, Congressional agricultural legislation took the
form of multi-year (usually five-year) omnibus Farm Bills that touched on
nearly every aspect of food and agricultural policy in the country.50 A
report by the Congressional Research Service gives the following
explanation for its development:
Although many [food and agricultural] policies can be and
sometimes are modified through freestanding authorizing
legislation or as part of other laws, the omnibus, multi-year
farm bill provides a predictable opportunity for
policymakers to address agricultural and food issues more
comprehensively.... The omnibus nature of the bill can
create broad coalitions of support among sometimes
conflicting interests for policies that individually might not
51survive the legislative process.
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 was the first such multi-year farm
legislation and contained a combination of federal commodity and farm-
47. See C. Edwin Young and Paul C. Westcott, The 1996 U.S. Farm Act Increases
Market Orientation, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE FN1 (1996), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib726/.
48. See Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. 143 1(a)-(b) (2010).
49. About the Commodity Credit Corporation, USDA FARM SERVICE AGENCY,
(Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.apfo.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=about&subject=landing
&topic=sao-cc.
50. According to the House Committee on Agriculture: The U.S. farm bill is the
primary agricultural and food policy tool of the federal government. The multi-year,
comprehensive omnibus bill contains federal commodity and farm support policies, as
well as other farm-related provisions. It usually amends some and suspends provisions
of permanent law, reauthorizes, amends, or repeals provisions of preceding temporary
agricultural acts, and puts forth new policy provisions for a limited time into the
future. . . . Nine bills between 1965 and 2002 are generally agreed to be farm bills; the
2008 farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, is the tenth.
Farm Bill, House COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, http://agriculture.house.gov/single
pages.aspx?NewslD=1227&LSBID=1271 (last visited April 5, 2011).
51. JOHNSON AND MONKE, supra note 45.
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support policies. 5 2  The 1965 Act established mandatory acreage
allotments, planting restrictions, marketing quotas, and payment and
diversion programs for a number of agricultural products.5 ' These
provisions were effective for only a limited number of years or until
another comprehensive Farm Bill renewed them. As the first omnibus
multi-year Farm Bill, the 1965 Act continues to serve as Congress' basic
template for farm policy. According to a Congressional Research Service
Report, the Farm Bill "include[s] titles on commodity programs, trade,
rural development, farm credit, conservation, agricultural research, food
and nutrition programs, marketing, etc." 5 4
The Agricultural Act 1970 was the next of many multi-year Farm
Bills.5 ' The 1970 Act relied on parity pricing, along with a farmland set-
aside program and market certificates that were redeemable for pre-
specified amounts of CCC-owned commodities. 56  The 1970 Act
additionally made several more restrictive aspects of the 1965, such as
acreage allotments and marketing quotas, open to voluntary participation
by farmers and for the first time imposed caps on payments to any single
agricultural producer.5 7 Because farming costs had been steadily increasing,
smaller farms continued to be consolidated into larger ones, and in order to
continue farming competitively, farmers at all levels needed greater access
to credit. 8 A new Farm Credit System was created in 1971 by the federal
Farm Credit Act, which paved the way for some of the controlled market-
orientation and the deregulation of many previously subsidized non-
agricultural goods that took place during the Nixon Administration.
52. See Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187
(1965), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/1965.pdf.
53. See id.
54. JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RS 97-905, AGRICULTURE: A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS, PROGRAMS, AND LAWS (2005), available at http://www.cnie.org/
NLE/CRSreports/05jun/97-905.pdf.
55. See Agricultural Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, 84 Stat. 1358 (1970).
56. James A. Langley, Robert D. Reinsel, John A. Craven, James A. Zellner, and
Frederick J. Nelson, Commodity Price and Income Support Policies in Perspective,
USDA AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT NO. AER530, 191 (July 1985), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer530/aer530h.pdf.
57. Annual payments were limited to $55,000 per producer per crop. The
Agricultural Act of 1970, P.L. 91-524 (1970); see also FARM COMMODITY
LEGISLATION: CHRONOLOGY, 1933-98 (Geoffrey S. Becker, ed.) (1999).
58. See Timeline ofFarming in the U.S., American Experience, supra note 42.
59. See id.
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D. The Food Crisis of the 1970s and the Farm Bill Subsidy Spigot
By the late 1970s, concerted industry lobbying efforts found a
sympathetic ear in the Nixon administration and succeeded in bringing
about a controlled process of market orientation and selective
deregulation.6 0 As described below, a number of programs were instituted
to provide agricultural producers with cheaper access to credit, a policy
which tended to favor even more consolidation. Other reforms included
the relaxation of acreage requirements and other policies that gave farmers
greater flexibility over what to grow. One notable form of deregulation
that did not take place, however, was the elimination of agricultural
subsidies. Instead, as a response to the food crisis of the early 1970s, a new
system of price guarantees was put in place to ensure adequate supply.
Once those subsidies had been implemented, interest groups worked
diligently to ensure that, whatever other market-oriented policies were
passed, these subsidies were not discontinued. As Michael Pollan wrote for
the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, "[t]he shift from an agricultural-support
system designed to discourage overproduction to one that encourages it
dates to the early 1970's."61
The 1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act was a
transformative bill that authorized subsidies in response to a global food
crisis marked by a severe worldwide decline in production.62 The 1973 Act
created several rural development and conservation programs; authorized
disaster response; amended the food stamp program; and, most notably,
initiated the system of target prices and deficiency payments.63 This bill
represents perhaps the most significant shift in American farm policy since
the Great Depression.
60. See Tom Philpott, The story behind the corn industry's cloying ad blitz, GRIST
(Oct. 18, 2008), available at http://grist.org/food/the-bitter-with-the-sweet/.
61. Michael Pollan, The Way We Live Now: The (Agri)Cultural Contradictions of
Obesity, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 12, 2003, available at http://michael
pollan.com/articles-archive/the-way-we-live-now-the-agricultural-contradictions-of-
obesity/.
62. See Richard Nixon, 231 - Statement on Signing the Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act of 1973, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3932#ixzzlsGLCVxwv (last visited June 18, 2012).
63. See Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, P.L. 93-86 (1973).
64. Charlene C. Kwan, Fixing the Farm Bill: Using the "Permanent Provisions" in
Agricultural Law to Achieve WTO Compliance, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 571, 598
(2009) ("In a complete reversal of policy, post-1973 farm policies sought to 'giv[e]
farmers incentive to produce as much as possible."') (citing Tom Philpott, Food First:
Institute for Food and Development Policy, The 2007 Farm-and Food-Bill,
BACKGROUNDER, Fall 2006, at 1, 3).
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Agricultural business had been lobbying for targeted deregulation for
decades, and President Nixon's Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, took up
this cause within the administration, arguing that overproduction and a
resultant drop in the price of commodity grains would increase exports and
facilitate the production of ethanol and synthetic sweeteners.65 In the wake
of the failed Russian Wheat Deal and the World Food Crisis of the early
1970s, Secretary Butz advocated for the elimination of support systems and
took the position that the problems associated with food surpluses could
best be reduced through free trade. 6 With rejoinders to farmers to "get big
or get out" and to grow corn "fencerow to fencerow," Butz helped usher in
a new era of agricultural production. 67  Butz dismantled supply
management policies and sold off government storage bins and food
reserves. Even before the Food Crisis, he had overseen the passage of
The 1972 Rural Development Act, which cut financial assistance to rural
communities and discontinued subsidies for a number of non-agricultural
products. 69 But rather than subjecting the agricultural sector to market
forces as his public comments proposed, Butz oversaw the implementation
of a new set of industry-favorable market regulations, the system of target
prices and deficiency payments,70 payments that commodity producers
would receive anytime the market price fell below the Congressionally
specified target price.7 ' As described in Part III, deficiency payments
continue to characterize the administration of subsidies for corn and other
covered commodities and remain a central component of subsequent
farming legislation.72
The next such omnibus Farm Bill, the Food and Agriculture Act of
1977," increased price and income supports for farmers, set acreage
allotments, and created the two-tier pricing support system, which paid
65. The Facts Behind King Corn, THE NATIONAL FAMILY FARM COALITION (NFFC),
http://www.nffc.net/Leam/Fact%20Sheets/King%2OCorn%2OFact%20Sheet.pdf.
66. See id.
67. See Farm Boom of the 1970s, Farming: 1970s to Today, WESSELS LIVING
HISTORY FARM, http://www.1ivinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe70s/money_02.html.
68. The Facts Behind Kind Corn, supra note 65.
69. See Timeline of Farming in the U.S., American Experience, supra note 42.
70. See Farm Boom of the 1970s, Farming: 1970s to Today, supra note 67.
71. See Deficiency Payment, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.business
dictionary.com/definition/deficiency-payment.html (last visited June 18, 2012).
72. See 2008 Farm Bill Side-by-Side: Title 1: Commodity Programs, USDA
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.ers.usda.gov/FarmBill/
2008/Titles/Titlelcommodities.htm#direct [hereinafter 2008 Farm Bill Side-by-Side].
73. Food and Agricultural Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977).
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farmers different prices for amounts grown in excess of quota amounts.74
The allotment and two-tiered support system were intended to keep the
market supply in commodities stable by simultaneously encouraging
farmers to comply and to use allotted acreage for the crops specified by the
government. The bill was followed in 1981 by the Agriculture and Food
Act,'7 which set four-year target prices for a number of commodities and
established marketing quotas."7 6 The quota, allotment, and price-setting
provisions of these bills support the proposition that Congress was using
subsidies to control price fluctuations and ensure a stable food supply. The
caps that were first introduced in the 1970 Act indicate that larger industrial
farmers were benefiting from the subsidy programs and that subsidy
programs had expanded beyond the welfare rationale that motivated the
original depression-era legislation.
The next of these multi-year omnibus Farm Bills, the Food Security
Act of 1985,77 served to reduce commodity prices and income supports for
farmers.78 Amendments to the 1985 Act79 changed acreage-based subsidy
calculations and gave USDA discretion to require cross-compliance for
feed grains rather than mandating them.80 Subsequent amendments in the
1986 and 1987 budget reconciliation bills8 1 required advance deficiency
payments to be made to producers at a minimum of 40% for wheat and
feed82 and set annual deficiency payment limitations at $50,000 per person
per crop. 83 The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade (FACT) Act of
199084 largely kept in place the existing subsidy delivery systems but
introduced several modest reform provisions that were intended to increase
74. See WOMACH, supra note 54, at 113; History of Agricultural Price-Support and
Adjustment Programs, 1933-84: Background for 1985 Farm Legislation, supra note
31, at 31-32.
75. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213 (1981).
76. See WOMACH, supra note 54, at 13
77. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
78. See generally id
79. Technical Corrections to Food Security Act of 1985 Amendments, P.L. 99-253
(1985); Food Security Improvements Act of 1986, P.L. 99-260 (1986).
80. Id
81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, P.L. 99-509, (1986); Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, P.L. 100-203, (1987).
82. CAROL CANADA AND JASPER WOMACH, AGRICULTURE: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS,
PROGRAMS, LAWS AND WEBSITES 90 (2000).
83. Id. at 91; See also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986; Appropriations
Bill, P.L. 99-591 (1987).
84. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624;
104 Stat. 3359 (1990).
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market-orientation and reduce subsidy-dependence. It did so by setting
target prices at 1990 levels and by giving farmers greater flexibility in
choosing what they would grow.8 6  The 1993 Omnibus Budget
Reallocation Act (OBRA)87 continued this topical approach to improving
market orientation by eliminating USDA's role in determining whether
land must be set aside for conservation or for commodity crops such as
corn, by reducing payments based on acreage.
In 1996, Congress passed the omnibus Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR).89 The bill was touted as a move to
simplify direct payment systems, alter the delivery of subsidies and loan
payments, and delink support payments from the market price of
commodities, replacing those payments with a fixed income payment tied
to acreage.90 The bill additionally modified stockholding, export subsidies,
and food aid programs. 91 According to the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization, "[o]n the whole, the FAIR Act reinforces
market-oriented policies, which had been initiated in 1985 and seeks to
reduce government intervention." 9 2 However, the attempt to overhaul the
deficiency payment system proved rather lackluster. Although the 1996
FAIR Act technically eliminated deficiency payments and replaced them
with production flexibility contract payments, the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 200293 reinstituted deficiency payments as counter-
85. See SUSAN L. POLLACK AND LORI LYNCH, USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
BULLETIN No. 624, PROVISIONS OF THE FOOD, AGRICULTURE, CONSERVATION, AND
TRADE ACT of 1990, 1 (1991), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib
624/aib624.pdf.
86. See id. at vii.
87. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
88. See id. at Subtitle C-Agricultural Trade, Sec. 1301-02.
89. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L.No. 104-127,
110 Stat. 888 (1996).
90. See FREDERICK J. NELSON AND LYLE P. SCHERTZ, USDA ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., AIB-729, PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL AGRICULTURE IMPROVEMENT AND
REFORM ACT OF 1996, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib729/
aib729a.pdf; The review of the 1996 farm legislation in the United States, FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/docrep/
w8488e/w8488e04.htm. See generally Farm and Commodity Policy: Glossary, USDA
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmpolicy/
glossary.htm (last visited June 18, 2012) (describing elements of the FAIR Act and
providing definitions of general applicability to Farm Bills).
91. See The review of the 1996 farm legislation in the United States, supra note 90.
92. See id.
93. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (2002).
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cyclical payments with somewhat different payment calculations. 4 The
move to end deficiency payments was in fact even more half-hearted and
short-lived than the preceding sentences suggest. Even during the short
period between 1996 and 2002, the system that replaced the target-based
deficiency model actually awarded subsidies on a per acre basis dependent
on previous deficiency payment receipts-in effect pegging payments to
the standard Congress was purportedly moving away from. 95  Farms
receiving large payments under the deficiency payment system continued
to receive "transition" per-acreage Production Flexibility Contracts (PFCs),
which were decoupled from market supply determinations but which
remained linked to amounts received under the deficiency payment
system. As researchers at the libertarian Cato Institute noted, "although
the new PFC subsidy payments are formally independent of production,
they still encourage oversupply." 97 This transition hardly had time to begin
before Congress intervened again. As market prices began falling in 1998,
Congress responded with a number of emergency spending bills providing
money to farmers, despite indications two years earlier that it would end
such payments. 98  This short-lived attempt at scaling back agricultural
subsidies, predictably, did little to alter the incentives created under the
prior deficiency and target payment systems. In reality, as the Office of
Budget Management (OMB) predicted and the USDA ERS has since
documented, agricultural subsidy payments continued to rise over that
period.99
The failed 1996 attempt at transitioning away from deficiency
payments seemed to discourage Congress from following through with its
deregulatory push. In 2002, the latest omnibus Farm Bill, the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,100 reintroduced a system of
deficiency payments similar to those eliminated in 1996, this time under
the name counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) which paid farmers the
94. See WOMACH, supra note 54, at 99.
95. See Mary Burfisher and Jeffrey Hopkins, Farm Payments: Decoupled Payments
Increase Households' Well-Being, Not Production, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE: AMBER WAVES (Feb. 2003), http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Feb03/
Features/FarmPayments.htm.
96. See Chris Edwards and Tad DeHaven, Farm Subsidies at Record Levels As
Congress Considers New Farm Bill, CATO INSTITUTE 4 (Oct. 18, 2001),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp70.pdf.
97. Id. at 5.
98. See id. at 2.
99. See id. at 2-3.




difference whenever the market price for a commodity fell below a
Congressionally specified target price.o Although the 2002 Farm Bill
faced significant opposition from both Democrats and Republicans in the
Senate, the final version of the bill did succeed in implementing lower caps
on the total combined subsidies paid to individual farmers at $275,000, half
the previous limit. 10 2
The most recent Farm Bill was the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 2008.10' The final 2008 Farm Bill kept in effect most of the subsidy
programs in the 2002 Farm Bill,'1 notwithstanding the record profits that
farmers had been earning.' 05  The 2008 Act adjusted eligibility
requirements and crop insurance programs,106 and retained provisions that
continued to provide direct payments and counter-cyclical payments at
precisely the same rates as the 2002 Farm Bill did between 2004 and
2007.107 Its passage was somewhat controversial and reveals the shifting
political considerations now bearing on the continuation of U.S.
commodity subsidies. The European Union, joined by Brazil, Argentina,
Canada, and others, filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization
against the United States asking for U.S. agricultural subsidies to be
discontinued because of their distortive effects on international markets. 08
George W. Bush attempted to veto the bill, citing the same concerns listed
in the complaint and noting that it deviated from free-market principles, but
he was unable to move the Senate off of its support for the existing subsidy
programs.109
101. See Gerald E. Plato, David W. Skully, and D. Demcey Johnson, Valuing
Counter-Cyclical Payments: Implications for Producer Risk Management and
Program Administration, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE ERR-39,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err39/err39a.pdf.
102. See Elizabeth Becker, Senate Passes $44.9 Billion Farm Bill Limiting Subsidies,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/14/us/senate
-passes-44.9-billion-farm-bill-limiting-subsidies.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
103. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub.L. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923
(2008).
104. See 2008 Farm Bill Side-by-Side, supra note 72.
105. See David M. Herszenhorn, Tentative Deal Reached in Congress on Farm Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/26/
washington/26farm.html.
106. See 2008 Farm Bill Side-by-Side, supra note 72.
107. See id.
108. See EU joins WTO complaint against U.S. corn subsidies, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/
business/worldbusiness/22iht-wto.4296092.html.
109. See Alan Bjerga, Senate Approves Farm Bill Over Bush Veto Threat,
BLOOMBERG Dec. 14, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
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III. THE INCENTIVE ARCHITECTURE OF THE CORN SUBSIDY
Agricultural subsidies were a sensible policy response to the deflation
that threatened American grain prices in the early 1930s and to address the
food shortages of the early 1970s. The legislative response to these two
crises was not to provide short-term cash injections, but to stabilize food
production by completely altering the market pressures confronting corn
farmers and other grain producers. The subsidies in the Farm Bill,
however, gave rise to incentives that had little relationship to actual market
demand, and furthermore, were not tailored properly to address only the
issue of maintaining a stable food supply. Because of agriculture's
relationship to other sectors of the economy, agricultural legislation has
impacted far more than the stability of agricultural prices.
Corn growers received over $56 billion in federal subsidies between
1995 and 2006, and it is expected that subsidies to corn growers may soon
exceed $10 billion per year.110 This direct outlay from the U.S. tax base is
only the beginning. To understand the full array of costs associated with
this legislation, corn subsidies cannot be viewed simply as recurring
payments from the federal treasury to farmers. Farm Bill subsidies
represent a much more comprehensive reconfiguration of incentives: they
are a game-changing event that produces systemic consequences far
beyond the markets in corn and commodity foods. The Farm Bill "sets the
rules for the American food system-indeed to a considerable extent for
the world's food system.""]
This Part seeks to examine the mechanisms through which the corn
subsidy provisions of the Farm Bill impact institutions and market
structures beyond the market in commodity corn. Section A provides an
account of the deficiency payments, direct payments, and non-recourse
loans that deliver agricultural subsidies. Section B describes the effect of
these subsidies on the relative cost of other foods and explores the impact
of subsidies on meat production and other secondary corn products, such as
those containing corn-derived high-fructose corn syrup. Section C
examines the healthcare expenses and increased costs, particularly those
related to the rising incidence of obesity and diabetes that are attributable to
newsarchive&sid=aWIfSjtJmPgE. In response to Bush's veto threat and
notwithstanding pressure from the international community, the Senate voted 79-14 to
retain the subsidy provisions at issue. See id
110. Brandon Keim, Fast Food: Just Another Name for Corn, WIRED MAGAZINE,
Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2008/1 1/fast-food-
anoth/.
111. See Pollan, supra note 2.
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overconsumption of corn-based food products and corn-fed animal
products. Section D looks at the environmental costs associated with
excessive corn production, and Section E considers the effect of U.S. corn
subsidies on global food prices and on international labor markets.
A. Deficiency Payments, Guarantees, and a Glut of Corn
As the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture describes it, "[t]he U.S.
farm bill is the primary agricultural and food policy tool of the federal
government."1 2 Corn subsidies affect the price of nearly everything in the
American food supply. This Section begins with a description of the
current administration of corn subsidies and how they affect prices, with
specific emphasis given to the use of deficiency payments in recent Farm
Bill legislation. Beyond subsidies' immediate effects on the price of com
and other commodity grains, this Section attempts to distinguish two
separate, but related processes through which subsidies lead to market
distortions throughout our food system. First, corn subsidies directly
reduce the manufacturing costs of all corn-containing products (an almost
endless list of products that contain refined sugars, corn syrup, corn starch,
coloring, etc.) and the costs of corn-fed animal products. This in turn
reduces consumer prices for these same products. Second, the relative
price of nonsubsidized (and often healthier) alternatives to these products is
made artificially high. The resulting reduced market share for
nonsubsidized alternatives translates into fewer market participants, further
exacerbating the less-than-optimal levels of competition that could be
making healthier or higher-welfare alternative foods more available.
It is worth exploring more in-depth how the payment system
contemplated in the Farm Bill legislation operates. There are three systems
for agricultural support: 1) deficiency or counter-cyclical payments; 2)
direct payments; and 3) non-recourse marketing loans. These three support
systems, and their interaction, produce a drastic change from the incentives
associated with traditional understandings of supply and demand. The
following summary of the first of these, deficiency payments, excerpted
from Jasper Womach's CRS Report for Congress, is a useful starting point:
The crop-specific deficiency payment rate was based on
the difference between the legislatively set target price and
the lower national average market price during a specified
112. 2008 Farm Bill, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, http://agriculture.house.
gov/singlepages.aspx?NewslD=1387&LSBID=23&RBSUSDA=T (last visited Apr. 3,
2011).
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time. The total payment was equal to the payment rate,
multiplied by a farm's eligible payment acreage and the
program payment yield established for the particular farm.
In the latter years of the program, farmers could receive up
to one-half of their projected deficiency payments at
program signup. If actual deficiency payments, which
were determined after the crop year, were less than
advance deficiency payments, the fanner was required to
reimburse the government for the difference.' 13
Congress, in other words, will compensate farmers for the difference
anytime the price falls below the legislative target. Although Congress
nominally eliminated the deficiency payment program with the 1996
legislation,'l 4 the counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) reintroduced in 2002
operate in essentially the same way, by paying farmers the difference when
the market price for a commodity falls below the target price.ns
Secondly, and without regard to annual fluctuations in price or yield,
direct payments of a fixed amount are available to commodity producers on
a per-bushel basis." 6 Direct payments are available regardless of whether
the market price is above or below the CCP target." 7 If the market price is
below the CCP target, the farmer will receive the difference between the
market price and the target, in addition to the legislatively determined
direct payment amount."'8 Under the 2002 Farm Bill, for example, farmers
were guaranteed $2.60 from 2002-03 and $2.63 from 2004-2007 per
bushel of corn under the deficiency payment system, on top of which they
would receive an additional direct payments of 28 cents per bushel.' 19 If
the market price in fact rose above the Congressionally created floor,
Congress would continue to pay direct subsidies at the rate of 28 cents per
bushel.120 The 2008 Farm Bill keeps the $2.63 target and the 28-cent direct
payment through the end of calendar year 2012.121
113. WOMACH, supra note 54, at 73.
114. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, P.L. 104-127,
(1996); see also WOMACH, supra note 54, at 73.
115. See, e.g., WOMACH, supra note 54, at 73.
116. 2008 Farm Bill Side-by-Side, supra note 72.
117. Id
118. Id.
119. Id See also The 2002 Farm Bill: Title I Commodity Programs, USDA (May 22,
2002), http://www.ers.usda.gov.




According to accepted economic models of supply and demand, an
increase in the supply of corn would drive prices down. Production,
accordingly, should only continue up to the point that the market price is
larger than the cost of production. That is, farmers would stop growing
corn if they were losing money on it. The problem is that the deficiency-
payments-plus-guarantee system of the recent Farm Bill makes sure that
can never happen. The price supports described here have eliminated these
market forces completely. By providing payments above the market value,
no matter what price the market reaches, the government over-stimulates
production, which further suppresses the market price while doing nothing
to reduce the availability of government price supports. The result is a
feedback loop without any signs of slowing down. Congress pays corn
growers no matter how many bushels they churn out; the incentive is to
always grow more, irrespective of market forces. As Laurence Lessig
observed in his TED lecture, Citizens. The Need and the Requirements,
"[s]ome economists estimate that the cost of growing corn is actually
negative. You get paid to grow corn." 22 This is not a functioning market.
The principles of supply and demand do not operate here. By offering to
extend payments whether prices rise or fall, Congress has literally handed a
blank check to corn growers.
The third major component of the federal agricultural support system
is the marketing loan program. "A key part of the federal farm subsidies
since the New Deal[,] this program was designed to provide short-term
financing to pay farm expenses before crops were sold, but it has morphed
into simply another multi-billion-dollar subsidy program."l 23 Under the
original system, the government extended loans to farmers to allow them to
pay operational expenses before harvest, and after the crops were sold,
122. Presentation of Laurence Lessig at TED San Antonio, Citizens, The Need and
the Requirements-Our Nation Desperately Needs Citizens, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xz3RdkO824A. See also Alicia Harvie and
Timothy A. Wise, Sweetening the Pot: Implicit Subsidies to Corn Sweeteners and the
U.S. Obesity Epidemic, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE: TUFTS
UNIVERSITY, http://www.ase.tufts.edulgdae/Pubs/rp/PBO9-01SweeteningPotFeb09.pdf
("GDAE estimated that corn and soybeans were priced 23% and 15% below their
average production costs, respectively, in the nine-year period following the 1996 Farm
Bill, 1997-2005.").
123. Edwards and DeHaven, supra note 96, at 6 (citing COMMISSION ON 21sT
CENTURY PRODUCTION AGRICULTURE, DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE FARM POLICY: THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN SUPPORT OF PRODUCTION AGRICULTURE 14-15 (Washington:
U.S. Dept. of Agric., Jan. 2001), available at http://www.usda.gov/oce/21st-
century/report.pdf).
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farmers would then repay the government.12 4 But because the loans were
non-recourse, farmers faced no penalty for not repaying when crop prices
were low except that they would forfeit their crops to the government.' 25
This, in effect, serves as an additional subsidy to corn growers, because
whenever the market price falls below the loan amount, the rational
economic strategy growers follow is to accept the government's marketing
loan. On top of this de facto subsidy, taxpayers also bear the expense of
maintaining the government's commodity stockpiles.126  The marketing
loan program also makes a second option, loan deficiency payments
(LDPs), available to farmers, which enables farmers to receive the subsidy
without actually structuring the payment as a secured nonrecourse loan. 12 7
Together the total cost of these programs between 1995 and 2010 totaled
$77.1 billion.12 8  That averages approximately $4.8 billion in annual
transfers to corn producers.' 29
B. Distorting Price Signals Throughout the Food Supply
This broken incentive system invites farmers to produce endlessly.
This results in a glut of corn that needs someplace to go. As corn flooded
the marketplace, its purchase price fell further and further relative to other
foodstuffs.130  Corn, in the form of high-fructose corn syrup, quickly
became a cheaper source of sugar than sugar cane.131 Similarly, corn
became a cheap feed grain for industrial animal producers, and corn even
became an input for ethanol energy producers, despite the fact that it yields
124. See id.
125. See id. (citing Farm and Commodity Policy: Basic Mechanisms of Programs,
USDA BRIEFING RooM; ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/
FarmPolicy/malp.htm).
126. See id.
127. See id. (citing Paul C. Westcott and C. Edwin Young, U.S. Farm Program
Benefits: Links to Planting Decisions and Agricultural Markets, USDA AGRICULTURAL
OUTLOOK, Oct. 2000, at 12.
128. 2011 Farm Subsidy Database, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP (June 2011),
http://farm.ewg.org/.
129. See id.
130. See, e.g. Tom Laskawy, Tax Junk Food, but also subsidize veggies, GRIST (May
20, 2009), http://www.grist.org/article/tax-the-bad-and-subsidize-the-good.
131. Michael Pollan, High-Fructose Corn Syrup Not Necessarily Worse Than Sugar,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/28/
michael-pollan-high-fructose-corn-syrup-sugar_n_1064246.html ("High-fructose corn




half of the ethanol per acre of other sugar sources. 132 Corn also has only a
breakeven energy ratio while other sources have a ratio of 8 to 1.133 This
tendency of surplus commodities to find their way into other parts of the
market or into the supply chain is an expected, predictable economic
outcome, as is an increase in consumption. "Since the Nixon
administration, farmers in the United States have managed to produce 500
additional calories per person every day (up from 3,300, already
substantially more than we need); each of us is, heroically, managing to put
away 200 of those surplus calories at the end of their trip up the food
chain."' 3 4 Compare the availability of corn to what happened in the lead up
to the recent financial crisis, when the over-availability of cheap credit
resulted in the proliferation of harmful financial products such as subprime
mortgages and teaser rate credit cards that led to overextended consumer
spending.'3 ' This is not to suggest that innovation in food products poses
analogous systemic risks. The point is, rather, that because corn is cheap
and plentiful, new uses for it are constantly being innovated. Although the
overall amount of food that people can eat is somewhat inelastic, the
market in specific foods is less so, particularly when the food product in
question can be used as an input and put to other ends.13 6 All of that excess
corn needed some place to go.
Consider the following passage from an essay by John Mackey, the
founder and CEO of Whole Foods, on the impact of corn subsidies on meat
production:
Each year, the federal government doles out billions of
dollars to the U.S. factory farming industries, especially
to keep artificially low the prices of corn and soybeans,
largely used as farmed animal feed. These large
corporations receive taxpayer money, and while this
does filter down to a certain extent to cheaper animal-
132. J.K. Bourne, Biofuels: Green Dreams, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZ[NE, Oct.
2007, at 41, available at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/10/biofuels/biofuels-
text.
133. See id.
134. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORES DILEMMA, 310 (1st ed. 2006).
135. See Adam J. Levitin, Foreword: The Crisis without a Face: Emerging
Narratives of the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999 (July 2009) ("Low interest
rates caused investors looking for high rates of return [to] move[] to riskier
investments.").
136. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (U.S.). COMMITTEE ON FOOD CONSUMPTION
PATTERNS, ASSEMBLY OF LIFE SCIENCES (U.S.), ASSESSING CHANGING FOOD
CONSUMPTION PATTERNS Appendix A at 58-59 (2001).
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based foods, it also distorts markets tremendously.
These subsidies allow animal products to be sold far
below their true costs.
Take corn subsidies, for example. Simply put,
government subsidizing of corn subsidizes the factory
farm animal production system, which is largely
dependent on corn for feed. Eliminating corn subsidies
is a first step to valuing animals more accurately. If
those subsidies were taken away, animal products in
general would become more expensive, and it is likely
that less meat, eggs, and milk would be bought as a
result-a positive outcome for our health, economy,
environment, and the animals themselves. In addition, if
corn were not subsidized by the government, higher
welfare products like grass-fed beef would become more
economically competitive in the market with beef from
cattle confined on feedlots-another way of giving
customers a fair alternative. 37
Meat and dairy production is a major, albeit indirect, recipient of the
subsidies for feed crops such as corn. According to data from the USDA,
in 2009 over 40% of corn grown in the United States was used as feed for
animals. 38
A report by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy estimates
that below-cost feed crops reduce operating costs for poultry and hog
producers and concludes that "these corporations' overall costs could be as
much as 7-10% higher if they compensated farmers fairly for the feed
components that they produce."' 39 Citing a recent Tufts University study,
Tom Philpott estimated that between 1997 and 2005 the combined
subsidies passed on to chicken, pork, beef and high-fructose corn syrup
137. John Mackey, Taxpayers, in GRISTLE: FROM FACTORY FARMS TO FOOD SAFETY
(THINKING TWICE ABOUT THE MEAT WE EAT) Moby with Miyun Park, ed., 27-28
(2010).
138. Tom Philpott, Why are we propping up corn production again?, GRIST (Mar. 25,
2010) http://www.grist.org/article/2010-03-25-corn-ethanol-meat-hfcs (citing USDA,
ERS, FEED OUTLOOK: U.S. CORN USAGE BY SEGMENT 1/10).
139. Dennis Olson, Below Cost Feed Crops, An Indirect Subsidy for Industrial




producers exceeded $26.5 billion.140 The lower prices for producers have
increased profit margins, but these reduced costs have also been passed on
to consumers and further increased the availability of meat and dairy
products.
As Heather Schoonover and Mark Muller have noted, "[t]he ability of
fast-food restaurants to put hamburgers on the 990 value menu can also be
linked to cheap commodities."l 4' A 2008 study by A. Hope Jahren and
Rebecca A. Kraft used carbon and nitrogen stable isotopes to infer the
source of feed to meat animals, and the influence of increased corn
production is undeniable.142 A writer for Wired Science summarized
Jahren and Kraft's findings thusly: "[c]hemical analysis from restaurants
across the United States shows that nearly every cow or chicken used in
fast food is raised on a diet of corn." 43 Together, meat and dairy products
make up the largest sources of cholesterol and saturated fat in the American
diet.'"
Another important and much-researched topic is the effect of corn
subsidies on the cost of products that are high in sugar, most notably in the
form of high-fructose corn syrup. As a result of subsidies, sugar tariffs,
and increased production, the price of corn fell relative to the price of
sugar. Once a Japanese researcher, Dr. Y. Takasaki, developed an
affordable industrial production method for converting corn starch into
high-fructose corn syrup, it became far more cost-effective for a broad
range of food manufacturers and producers to rely on synthesized corn
sugars such as high-fructose corn syrup rather than cane sugar as a primary
sweetener.14 5 This was particularly true given the low price of corn that
resulted from over-stimulated production attributable to the agricultural
140. Philpott, Why are we propping up corn production again?, supra note 138
(citing Harvie and Wise, supra note 122).
141. Heather Schoonover & Mark Muller, Food Without Thought: How U.S. Farm
Policy Contributes to Obesity 6, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y (2006),
http://www.iatp.org/files/421_2_80627.pdf.
142. See A. Hope Jahren and Rebecca A. Kraft, Carbon and nitrogen stable isotopes
in fast food: Signatures of corn and confinement, THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES (2008), http://www.pnas.org/content/105/46/17855.
143. Brandon Keim, Fast Food: Just Another Name for Corn, supra note 1 10.
144. See Gary Null, Hillard Fitzkee, Steven Null, and Martin Feldman, Measuring
Food Proteins, ALTERNATIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY THERAPIES, 2(5): 328-334.
(Sept./Oct. 1996), available at http://online.1iebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/act.1996.
2.328. Jane Black, The War on Pizza, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Feb. 4, 2011, available at
http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/71280.
145. See, e.g. Enas Imail, High Fructose Corn Syrup, QUINTESSENTIAL MAGAZINE,
Nov. 1, 2009, available at http://www.qwmagazine.com/2009/1 1/01/high-corn-fructose
-syrup-what-you-should-know/.
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subsidies in place during the 1970s.146 As was true for meat production,
these lower manufacturing costs translated into increased production and
lower prices for end consumers for a broad range of HFCS-containing
foods. Benforado, Hanson, and Yosifon made the following observation:
While it would be intuitive to imagine this as a good thing
for the health of Americans-a way to increase the
consumption of vegetables-it turns out that most of the
subsidy does not go toward producing fresh ears of corn
for the local farmers market, but rather into producing
inexpensive, high-calorie, highly-processed foods like
soda, candy, and hotdogs.147
It is incredibly doubtful that then Secretary of Agriculture Butz, or anyone
in Congress, anticipated this precise outcome, but once industry gradually
began to identify a strong dependence on the corn subsidy, the position that
the subsidy was operating in the public interest became less plausible.
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), for example, is one of the nation's leading
manufacturers of high-fructose corn syrup and other corn-based
sweeteners, and in 1995, at least 43% of its profits came from government
subsidized activities.148 High-fructose corn syrup is now found in over
40% of all products in the supermarket. 14 9 A recent study in the American
Journal of Clinical Nutrition found that, "[b]y 2004, HFCS provided
roughly 8% of total energy intake compared with total added
sugar.. .accounting for 17% of total energy intake."' 50 It is not just corn
subsidies adding to this discrepancy in price between high-fructose corn
syrup and refined sugar. The U.S. also imposes tariffs and quotas on
imported cane sugar,'51 further exacerbating the relative price differences
between high-fructose corn syrup and other forms of sugar and stimulating
146. See The Facts Behind King Corn, supra note 65, at 2.
147. Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales, Obesity and
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1792-93 (2004) (citing James Bovard, Archer
Daniels Midland, A Case Study in Corporate Welfare, CATO INSTITUTE (Sept. 26,
1995), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-241.html) (examining the government's failure
to recognize the connection among corn subsidies, high fructose corn syrup, and
obesity).
148. Bovard, supra note 147.
149. Presentation of Laurence Lessig, supra note 122.
150. Kiyah J. Duffey and Barry M. Popkin, High-fructose corn syrup: is this what's
for dinner?, 88 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR CLINICAL NUTRITION (Dec. 2008),
http://www.ajcn.org/content/88/6/1722S.abstract.
151. James Bovard, The Great Sugar Shaft, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUNDATION
(Apr. 1998), available at http://www.fff.org/freedom/0498d.asp.
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the market toward greater dependences, innovations, and markets of scale
involving high-fructose corn syrup and other corn-derived sugars.
The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy's 2006 study, Food
Without Thought: How U.S. Farm Policy Contributes to Obesity, used data
from the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) to document a number
of changes in U.S. food consumption.15 2 One of their most significant
findings, as reported by the New York Times, is that, "[b]etween 1985 and
2000 the cost of [unsubsidized] fresh fruits and vegetables increased nearly
40% while the price of soft drinks [the main ingredient of which is corn-
based HFCS] decreased by almost 25 percent, adjusted for inflation."' 53
Fast food and supermarket nutrition studies have similarly shown that
while one dollar buys "1,200 calories of potato chips and cookies; spent on
whole foods like carrots, the same dollar buys only 250 calories."'54 In the
period between 1997 and 2003, the average cost of vegetables increased by
17%, while the cost of a Big Mac went down by 5.4%, and the cost of a
bottle of Coca-Cola decreased by 35%. 155 William Eubanks discussed
these types of findings in his comprehensive article on the negative
economic effects of the Farm Bill and drew the following conclusion:
Thus, food products highly subsidized under the Farm Bill
such as HFCS-laden sodas, candy, and other unhealthy
processed foods actually saw their supermarket prices
decrease as a result of subsidy-propelled market distortion,
while unsubsidized fruits and vegetables saw a spike in
price. It is quite clear where consumer choice went as a
result of the inequitable system that makes unhealthy sodas
cheap and nutritious food expensive. 5 6
The combined facts that the Farm Bill stimulates the production of cheap
corn-derived sugars while doing little to support farmers growing fresh
produce help explain the growing price gap between healthy and unhealthy
foods.'57 While acknowledging that some critics of the corn subsidy, such
as Michael Pollan, "might be overstating" the causal link to the price of
152. Schoonover & Muller, supra note 141 at 6.
153. Marian Burros, The Debate Over Subsidizing Snacks, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/dining/04farm.htmi.
154. Pollan, supra note 134, at 107-08.
155. Presentation of Laurence Lessig, supra note 122.
156. William S. Eubanks II. A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental
Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 213, 287-88 (2009).
157. See Pollan, supra note 2.
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high-fructose corn syrup, an independent study by researchers at the Tufts
University Global Development and Environment Institute made the
following findings:
U.S. farm policy effectively lowered corn prices and
HFCS production costs, offering HFCS producers an
implicit subsidy of $243 million a year, a savings of $2.2
billion over the nine-year period, and over $4 billion since
1986. For soda bottlers, the main consumers of HFCS and
among those most heavily implicated in public health
concerns, the savings amounted to nearly $100 million per
year, $873 million over the nine-year period, and nearly
$1.7 billion since the wholesale adoption of HFCS by the
soda industry in the mid-eighties. 58
The USDA has similarly recognized that increasing the price of
HFCS-sweetened products would lead to significant reductions in
consumption.159 While consumption taxes could begin to accomplish that
objective, eliminating the active indirect subsidization of high-fructose corn
syrup production offers either an alternative or a supplemental means of
reducing consumption,1o and cutting subsidies would avoid some of the
political opposition that would almost certainly accompany any proposed
consumption tax.
C. The Effect of Commodity Subsidies on Diet, Nutrition, and Healthcare
Costs
The problem is not just that corn-based products are relatively
cheaper than competitors as a result of subsidy payments. These foods are
158. Harvie and Wise, supra note 122, at 1.
159. Travis A. Smith, Biing-Hwan Lin, and Rosanna Morrison, Taxing Caloric
Sweetened Beverages To Curb Obesity, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE: AMBER
WAVES (Sep. 2010), http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Septemberl0/Features/
TaxingCaloricBeverages.htm ("ERS researchers found that a 20-percent tax on caloric
sweetened beverages could reduce consumption, calorie intake, and body weight even
after accounting for increased consumption of alternative beverages.").
160. A recent study of the implicit subsidy to HFCS manufacturers found that "[i]f
corn had been priced at its true cost, HFCS-55 prices (the major sweetener for soft
drinks) would have been an estimated 8.8% higher." Harvie and Wise, supra note 122,
at 4 (citing John C. Beghin and Hellen H. Jensen, Farm Policies and Added Sugars in
US Diets, (Ctr. for Agricultural and Rural Development: Iowa State University,




often less healthy as well. 16 1 Michael Pollan states this quite poignantly
where he writes, "[a]bsurdly, while one hand of the federal government is
campaigning against the epidemic of obesity, the other hand is actually
subsidizing it by writing farmers a check for every bushel of corn they can
grow."l 6 2  As noted previously, farmers in the U.S. produce 500 more
calories per person every day than they did in the early 1970s, and
Americans consume an additional 200 of those calories.163 Many of those
calories are from ,IM corn-fed animal products,' 6 5 or from high-
fructose corn syrup specifically.' 66  "Studies suggest that we metabolize
high fructose corn syrup differently than ordinary sugar, and consumption
of high fructose corn syrup is a major factor in weight gain."l 67 There is
also some evidence that high-fructose corn syrup does not send the same
satiety signals to the brain as sugar consumption.168 To make matters
worse, the way in which high-fructose corn syrup is metabolized by the
liver raises additional health concerns and "can result in higher levels of
triglycerides, which are associated with heart disease and stroke."' 69
In a major 2004 study about the relationship between food costs and
obesity, epidemiologist Adam Drewnowski demonstrated that price
distortions have a significant and overwhelmingly negative affect on what
161. Specifically, high-fructose corn syrup and corn as animal feed have reduced the
manufacturing costs for soda, snacks like chips and candy bars, and meat. These
lowered costs result in lower prices for consumers and encourage consumption in
excess of a free-market equilibrium. See supra, Section II, Part B.
162. Pollan, supra note 61.
163. Pollan, supra note 131, at 103.
164. See What Are We Eating? What the Average American Consumes in a Year,
VISUAL EcoNOMIcs, http://www.visualeconomics.com/food-consumption-in-america
2010-07-12/ (citations omitted) (stating the average American eats 56 pounds of corn
per year).
165. See id. (stating the average American eats 62.4 pounds of beef, 46.5 pounds of
pork, and 60.4 pounds of chicken per year).
166. Dana Burnett, High Fructose Corn Syrup: How much do you consume?,
HEALTHY AGING REVIEW (Jan. 11, 2011), http://healthyagingreview.com/?p=960 ("On
average, Americans consume 132 calories of HFCS each day. The top 20 percent of
HFCS consumers eat over 300 calories daily.").
167. Eric Schlosser, Forward to ANNA LAPPE & BRYANT TERRY, GRUB: IDEAS FOR
AN URBAN ORGANIC KITCHEN 35 (2006).
168. See Barbara L. Atwell, Obesity, Public Health, and the Food Supply, 4 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 3, 13 (2007) (citing Sharon S. Elliott et al., Fructose, Weight Gain,
and the Insulin Resistance Syndrome, 76 AM. I. CLINICAL NUTRITION 911, 911-22
(2002)).
169. Id. at 13.
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Americans eat. 170  "[D]iets based on refined grains, added sugars, and
added fats are more affordable than the recommended diets based on lean
meats, fish, fresh vegetables, and fruit."'171 Pollan summarized these
findings, writing, "Drewnowski concluded that the rules of the food game
in the U.S. are organized in such a way that if you are eating on a budget,
the most rational economic strategy is to eat badly-and get fat." 7 2 As
described above, subsidies have reduced the real cost consumers pay for a
range of sugar- and fat-laden products, while healthier foods such as
unprocessed fruits and vegetables have seen significant real price
increases. 7 1 Changes in relative prices, in no small way attributable to
government subsidies for corn and soybeans, are affecting how Americans
eat for the worse, even undercutting the USDA's own dietary guidelines.174
These price differences correspond to predictable increases in the
consumption of calories from corn-derived foods high in fats and simple
sugars.175 The following graph from USDA Economic Research Service
demonstrates how much increased consumption of corn sweeteners has
contributed to overall sweetener consumption in the United States:
170. See generally Drenowski Adam, Obesity and the food environment: dietary
energy density and diet costs, 27 American Journal of Preventative Medicine, Oct.
2004, at 154, reprinted in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EATING AND PHYSICAL
ACTIVITY BEHAVIORS: EXPLORING EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO COMBAT OBESITY (J.O.
Hill, R. Sturm, & C.T. Orleans, eds.).
171. Id. at 154.
172. Pollan, supra note 2.
173. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
174. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, LET'S EAT FOR THE HEALTH OF
IT, available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/DietaryGuidelines/2010/
DG2010Brochure.pdf.
175. "Many consumers choose the most cost-effective means of obtaining necessary
calories, which unfortunately is found in unhealthy foods because of price distortion
under the Farm Bill." Eubanks, supra note 156, at 288.
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Estimated per capita sweetener consumption,
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Benforado, Hanson, and Yosifon have explained the "causal chain," as
follows: "subsidies lowered the cost of corn; cheap corn lowered the cost of
sweet, processed foods; lower prices on things like soda increased
consumption; and consuming more of these types of foods made us gain
weight."l 77
Consumption of H{FCS-sweetened beverages has been linked to
greater weight gain and an increased risk of Type 2 diabetes in women.7
Health professionals also recognize that "calories from those subsidized
foods are partly responsible for the epidemic of childhood obesity and the
increased incidence of diabetes."1 79  Over half of all newly diagnosed
diabetes cases since 1980 are in people under the age of 18,180 a rate that
was unthinkable a few decades earlier. Industry groups, such as the Corn
Refiners Association, assert that high-fructose corn syrup is no more
harmful than cane sugar, 18 ' although studies by the American Medical
Association continue to emphasize the need for continued epidemiological
176. STEPHEN HALEY, JANE REED, BIING-HWAN LIN, AND ANNETTA COOK, USDA
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., SWEETENER CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 3 (2005),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/SSS/aug05/sss24301/sss24301.pdf.
177. Benforado, Hanson, and Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 147, at 1794.
178. See Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, Frequent Consumption of
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Linked to Greater Weight Gain and Type 2 Diabetes in
Women (Aug. 24, 2004), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-
releases/archives/2004-releases/press08242004.html; see also Frank B. Hu, MD,
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, Weight Gain, and Incidence of Type 2 Diabetes in Young
and Middle-Aged Women, 292 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 927-34
(Aug. 25, 2004).
179. Marian Burros, The Debate Over Subsidizing Snacks, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/04/dining/04farm.html.
180. Presentation of Laurence Lessig, supra note 122.
181. See, e.g. Registered Dietitians share their views about High Fructose Corn
Syrup, SWEET SURPRISE, http://www.sweetsurprise.com/experts-on-hfcs/dietitians.
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studies.182 Irrespective of that debate and the relative harms of cane sugar
and high-fructose corn syrup, there is overwhelming and indisputable
evidence that high-fructose corn syrup has contributed to a major increase
in the overall consumption of high-calorie sweeteners, and as sweetener
consumption has increased, there has been a corresponding increase in
diabetes, obesity, and other weight-related health issues.183
By some estimates, healthcare costs for obesity and for weight-related
diabetes exceed $147 billion annually.184  The Society of Actuaries
Committee on Life Insurance Research believes the actual total costs are
far higher.185 Beyond diabetes, obesity increases the risk of heart disease
and stroke and imposes a number of costs associated with mobility and
increased morbidity.'86 "We estimate that total annual economic cost of
overweight and obesity in the United States and Canada caused by medical
costs, excess mortality and disability is approximately $300 billion in
2009.",18' A 2006 study revealed that "obese patients spent an average of
$1,429 more for their medical care than did people within a normal weight
range,"" costs which taxpayers end up paying for in the form of increased
expenditures on government healthcare programs. In his article, A Rotten
System, William Eubanks describes how deeply corn subsidies undercut the
needs of our health care system: "as taxpayers, we are paying agribusiness
and food processors through Farm Bill subsidies and then turning around
and spending more tax dollars on the rising health care costs driven by the
same agribusiness and food processing giants that stock our shelves with
unhealthy food."' 89
182. COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (A-08) REPORT 3, THE HEALTH
EFFECTS OF HIGH FRUCTOSE SYRUP (2008), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/443/csaph3a08-summary.pdf.
183. See generally George Bray, Samara Nielsen, and Barry Popkin, Consumption of
high-fructose corn syrup in beverages may play a role in the epidemic of obesity, 79
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 537 (Apr. 2004).
184. Presentation of Laurence Lessig, supra note 122; see also Anderson JW and
Jhaveri MA, Reductions in medications with substantial weight loss with behavioral
intervention, 5 Curr Clin Pharmacol 232 (Nov. 2010).
185. See Donald F. Behan and Samuel H. Cox, Obesity and its Relation to Mortality
and Morbidity Costs, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES COMMITTEE ON LIFE INSURANCE
RESEARCH, (Dec. 2010), http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/research-2011-obesity-relation-
mortality.pdf.
186. See, e.g., Prevention Makes Common Cents, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/prevention/prevention.pdf.
187. Behan and Cox, supra note 187.
188. Diana Holden, Fact Check: The cost of obesity, CNN FIT NATION (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/09/fact.check.obesity/index.html.
189. Eubanks, supra note 156, at 287.
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D. The Environmental Costs and Ecological Impact of Commodity
Subsidies
"[I]ndustrialized commodity crop farming is putting strains on natural
systems."'190 Corn production is an extremely land- and resource-dependent
industry, and as John Mackay wrote, "[b]y focusing solely on making food
as cheap as possible, we have often overlooked the grave environmental
costs-which will some day be hard economic costs."' 9 ' Not all of these
costs are deferred, however. The corn industry's dependence on fossil
fuels, for example, produces both long-term externalities, and in the short-
term adds to the cost of gasoline and adds risk to the agricultural sector by
linking food costs to the cost of oil.192  Gareth Collins has further
documented that "[m]odern farming practices contribute heavily to
environmental problems like: water pollution, hypoxia zones, biodiversity
loss, and soil erosion." 93 Le Seur and Abelkop have noted the difficulty
parsing apart the environmental burdens or tracing them directly to
individual commodities like corn:
It would be too massive an undertaking for a single article
to catalog all of the socioeconomic, public health, and
environmental impacts to which commodity subsidies
contribute. It is also an oversimplification to assign
specific impacts to commodity subsidies, which are
interlocking pieces in a more complex market reality. Such
analysis is the proper role of an EIS.194
For precisely this reason, this article does not attempt to offer an exhaustive
list or to make any exacting attributions. There is considerable research
available about many of the most salient environmental harms associated
190. Gareth Collins, Ending Corn Subsidies: A Small Step Toward Sustainable Farm
Policy, 4 ROOSEVELT VANGUARD, 25, 28, (2009-2010), available at
http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/sites/all/files/Vanguard%20Vol.%201V%20-
%202009-2010.pdf.
191. Mackey, supra note 137.
192. See Caroline Henshaw, Rising Oil Prices Will Send Food Prices Even Higher,
WALL ST. J.: THE SOURCE, (Mar. 3, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/03/03/
rising-oil-prices-will-send-food-prices-even-higher/.
193. Collins, supra note 190, at 27.
194. Carrie Lowry La Seur and Adam D.K. Abelkop, Forty Years After NEPA 's
Enactment, It Is Time for a Comprehensive Farm Bill Impact Statement, HARVARD L.
& POL'Y REV. 201, 204 (2010).
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with American agricultural subsidies, and this Section is meant to provide
only a brief introduction.
Growing corn turns out to be extremely energy inefficient as it is
currently practiced. Michael Pollan described the extent to which this
biological process that can convert sunlight into stored energy in the form
of food has, through perverse industrial systems, actually come to require
more fossil fuel inputs than the energy actually contained in the food.'9
Consider the following excerpt:
When you add together the natural gas in the fertilizer to
the fossil fuels it takes to make the pesticides, drive the
tractors, and harvest, dry, and transport the corn, you find
that every bushel of industrial corn requires the equivalent
of between a quarter and a third of a gallon of oil to grow
it-or around fifty gallons of oil per acre of corn. (Some
estimates are much higher.) Put another way, it takes more
than a calorie of fossil fuel energy to produce a calorie of
food; before the advent of chemical fertilizer the Naylor
farm produced more than two calories of food energy for
every calorie of energy invested. From the standpoint of
industrial efficiency, it's too bad we can't simply drink the
petroleum directly. 196
For reasons described above, the federal subsidy encourages fencerow-to-
fencerow production, incentivizing fertilizer dependence, oil-dependent
industrial farming techniques, and does not provide farmers any incentive
to rotate crops to take advantage of natural efficiencies. Without pressure
to keep costs below the market price, farmers' dependency on fossil fuels is
encouraged even beyond the already unsustainable levels stipulated
through market pricing mechanisms.
Millions of acres of conservation land have already been diverted to
corn production,1 9 7 and researchers have projected that as many as 2.9
million additional acres may be diverted to meet short-term demand for
ethanol.19 8 Sections of the Farm Bill are often at cross-purposes with
respect to land conservation. In 2002, for example, the Farm Bill
reintroduced counter cyclical (i.e. deficiency) payments for corn, grain, and
other commodities, which stimulated increased production, and at the same
195. Pollan, supra note 134, at 45-46.
196. Id.
197. See La Seur and Abelkop, supra note 194, at 202-05.
198. See id. at 206.
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time set aside nearly $22 billion for expanded conservation programs,
which led a New York Times reporter to write that "the [2002] farm bill
could become the most sweeping environmental legislation since the Clean
Air Act of 1990."l99
Somewhat surprisingly, the USDA has never been required to offer a
full environmental impact statement (EIS) for its implementation of most
major Farm Bill policies.20 0 The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) requires an EIS before the enactment of any "legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 20 1 But, as Le Seur and Abelkop have demonstrated, the
USDA has only made segmented attempts at NEPA compliance even as
"the scope and ecological impact of the Farm Bills have swelled in recent
decades." 20 2  While the environmental harms listed in the preceding
paragraphs are by no means exhaustive, the fossil-fuel dependence of
subsidized com producers, the indirect subsidization of resource intensive
meat production, soil erosion, water pollution and other aquatic
degradation, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the diversion of land
designated for conservation are all variously implicated in our current
commodity support systems. Le Seur and Abelkop have noted the
difficulty parsing apart the environmental burdens or tracing them directly
to individual commodities like corn, but, they emphasize, the USDA is the
agency that has a statutory mandate to begin making this effort.203
E. Destabilizing Effects on International Food Prices and Global Labor
Markets
An astounding 38.7% of the world's corn is grown in the United
States.204 Much of that corn is consumed domestically, converted into
ethanol, or dedicated to meat production or other secondary manufacturing
products such as high-fructose corn syrup and plastics. However, a large
portion of corn is exported and has a significant effect on the global price.
The USDA ERS reported the United States' share of world corn exports
averaged in excess of 60 percent between 2003 and 2008.205 in 2010, the
199. Becker, supra note 102.
200. See La Seur and Abelkop, supra note 194, at 202.
201. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C) (2010).
202. La Seur and Abelkop, supra note 194, at 202.
203. See id. at 211-216.
204. 2011 World of Corn, NATIONAL CORN GROWERS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ncga.com/uploads/useruploads/woc-201 I.pdf.
205. Corn: Trade, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE BRIEFING RooM,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/corn/trade.htm (last visited March 21, 2011).
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U.S. exported four times more corn than the second largest corn exporter,
206
Argentina. The predictable result of the U.S. saturation of the global
market in corn is the depression of corn prices, and this is precisely what
has come to pass.2 07 While this produces tangible benefits and lowers costs
for consumers and international producers who rely on corn, that is not the
end of the story.
Perhaps the single most cited harm that results from the suppression
of agricultural prices is the disruption of family and community farming
practices in other parts of the world. Families throughout Africa, Asia, and
Latin America that have grown food for generations are no longer able to
earn a sustainable income. 20 8 Regardless of what crops these farmers were
growing, the abundance of artificially cheap American corn reduces
demand for their crops to be consumed in their own country, either directly
or as feed or another industrial input.2 09 The New York Times, reporting
on the devastating impact that 'free-trade' agreements and entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) produced had in the Philippines where
farmers were unable to compete with subsidized American agribusiness:
Instead of making any gains, the Philippines has lost
hundreds of thousands of farming jobs since joining the
W.T.O. Its modest agricultural trade surpluses of the early
1990s have turned into deficits. Filipinos.. .increasingly
view the much-promoted globalization as a new
imperialism. Despair in the countryside feeds a number of
potent anti-government insurgencies. 210
A number of international human rights and labor advocates attempted to
give voice to those suffering under this situation in a book called
Manifestos on the Future of Food & Seed, underscoring, among other
206. Corn exports (most recent) by country, NATION MASTER
http://www.nationmaster.com/red/pie/agr gra cor exp-agriculture-grains-com-exports.
207. See Uncle Sam's Teat: Can America's farmers be weaned from their
government money?, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/7887994 ("America's farm subsidies, unlike
Europe's, have become more, rather than less, trade-distorting. Most of the direct cash
is lavished on crops, particularly corn (maize), soyabeans (sic), rice, cotton and wheat,
often depressing world prices.").







things, how crucial the political economy of food remains among many of
the world's people. 2 1 1 The problem goes far beyond simply putting a strain
on family farmers and indigenous populations. Displaced farmers swell the
number of unemployed, and foreclosed-on farmers then come to the cities
with their families, fill urban ghettos, and contribute to political and social
unrest.212 As Michael Pollan observed,
By making it possible for American farmers to sell their
crops abroad for considerably less than it costs to grown
them, the farm bill helps determine the price of corn in
Mexico and the price of cotton in Nigeria and therefore
whether farmers in those places will survive or be forced
off the land, to migrate to the cities-or to the United
States.213
Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has also written on the
devastating distortions to third-world prices that subsidies have caused,
noting that U.S. prices reduce farm incomes around the world and make it
harder for farmers to sustain themselves and their families.214
This is not just a problem in the abstract. The European Union and a
number of its trade partners have at various times indicated their
dissatisfaction with U.S. subsidies as these programs have been
characterized as protectionist, disruptive to free trade, and even, at times, as
outright harmful.2 15 The WTO, for instance, following a complaint brought
by Brazil against the United States, determined that some U.S. subsidy
programs for cotton were prohibited.2 16  "West Africa was similarly
devastated by declining cotton prices spurred by American cotton subsidies
which led West African farmers to state, '[t]he more we produce, [t]he
211. See MANIFESTOS ON THE FUTURE OF FOOD & SEED 6-7 (Vandana Shiva, ed.
2007).
212. See generally RAMI ZURAYK, FOOD, FARMING, AND FREEDOM: SOWING THE
ARAB SPRING, (2011) (discussing food and agricultural policies in the Middle East).
213. Pollan, supra note 2.
214. According to Stiglitz, "when subsides(sic) lead to increased production with
little increase in consumption, as is typical with agricultural commodities ... [the result
is] lower prices for producers, lower incomes for farmers, and more poverty among
poor farmers in the Third world." Eubanks, supra note 161, at 234 (citing Joseph
Stiglitz, The Tyranny of King Cotton, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 8, 2006),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz76; DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT:
THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO A FOOD AND FARM BILL 33, 72-73 (2007)).
215. See EU joins WTO complaint against U.S. corn subsidies, supra note 108.
216. See id.
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more we export, [t]he poorer we get."' 2 17 William Eubanks summarized
the emerging global consensus regarding the U.S. subsidy program as
follows: "[d]eveloping nations and international institutions such as the
World Bank have placed increased pressure on the United States and the
European Union to phase out agricultural export subsidies over the past
decade, but developed nations have made few efforts to eliminate such
subsidies."2 18
International agricultural markets, insurance systems, and recent
financial product innovations may provide some safeguard against seasonal
and regional risks, and domestic grain shortages are far less of a danger to
any one nation's food supply than in previous decades. 2 19 These same
financial innovations, however, have resulted in a large transfer of wealth
to sophisticated institutional investors while making food less accessible.220
And while the relationships between commodity subsidies, derivatives, and
more recent financial product innovations such as long-only index funds
can be extremely difficult to parse apart, the United States government's
role generates significant moral hazard, contributes to disruptions in
traditional market pricing, and further fuels political unrest throughout the
developing world.2 21  The cost of a spike in food costs, whether driven
through speculation or other shocks to international food prices, could
cause massive inflation. 2 2 2 Although the existence of agricultural subsidies
might appear to some to mitigate a rise in prices, that conclusion overlooks
the fact that inflation will increase production costs across the board and
further ignores that many indigenous farmers have been driven off their
land as a result of market-distortive trade policies.
Furthermore, events throughout the Middle East in early 2011 should
underscore the extent to which agricultural prices and unemployment more
217. Eubanks, supra note 156, at 234 (citing IMHOFF, supra note 214, at 79).
218. Id.
219. See Risk Management in Agriculture, Towards Market Solutions in the EU,
DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR
INTERNET EN-PROD/PROD0000000000262553.PDF.
220. See Anthony Kammer, Food Prices, a Speculator Sport?, HARVARD LAW &
POLICY REVIEW BLOG: NOTICE AND COMMENT (Feb. 28, 2011) http://hlpronline.com/
2011/02/food-prices-a-speculator-sport/.
221. See id; see also Friedrick Kaufman, The Food Bubble: How Wall Street starved
millions and got away with it, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, July 2010, available at
http://frederickkaufman.typepad.com/files/the-food-bubble-pdf.pdf.
222. See, e.g., Alex Frangos, How Oil and Food Prices Impact Asia, and Other





generally can quickly transform into civil unrest significant social
223 hs
uprisings. The hostility and political unrest produced by these price
distortions,2 2 4 to the extent that those price distortions can be attributed to
U.S. policies, 2 2 5 have the potential to contribute to anti-American
sentiment. Laurence Lessig has criticized the hypocrisy of the United
States' "free-trade" strategy, which combines forcing international
enforcement of copyrights while simultaneously using corporate welfare
subsidies to inundate global agricultural markets with American
commodities, noting "[w]hile the US sings the virtues of free trade to
defend maximalist intellectual property regulation, we poison the free trade
that developing nations care about most-agriculture-by subsidizing
farming in the industrialized world to the tune of $300 billion annually." 2 26
The WTO, as noted previously, has proposed sanctions against the United
States because of these practices, and other nations have, at times, refused
to participate in trade negotiations with the U.S. 2 27
IV. U.S. POLITICAL STRUCTURES PREVENT BAD FOOD POLICIES FROM
GETTING BETTER
Corn subsidies are an unpopular policy with both the political left and
right. Free-market advocates and libertarians have long decried the market
distortions and inefficiencies that corn subsidies create. Republican House
Speaker John Boehner, for instance, has compared the Farm Bill to a "slush
223. See, e.g., Fighting Over Food: Soaring food prices are spreading hunger and
helping to spark revolutions in the Mideast. Why is food so scarce?, THE WEEK
MAGAZINE, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://theweek.com/article/index/212433/
fighting-over-food; Rami Zurayk, Use your loaf why food prices were crucial in the
Arab spring, THE OBSERVER, July 16, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
lifeandstyle/201 1/jul/I 7/bread-food-arab-spring.
224. See Sanjeev Gupta, Marijn Verhoeven, Robert Gillingham, Christian Schiller,
Ali Mansoor, and Juan Pablo Cordoba, Equity and Efficiency in the Reform of Price
Subsidies: A Guide for Policymakers, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Dec. 2000),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/equity/index.htm.
225. See generally Kaufman, supra note 221 (noting that financial deregulation in
U.S. agricultural commodities has contributed to global price instability); RANDY
SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BRAZIL'S AND CANADA'S WTO CASES AGAINST
U.S. AGRICULTURAL DIRECT PAYMENTS (2010), available at http://www.nationalag
lawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL34351.pdf (summarizing two complaints filed at the World
Trade Organization against the U.S. for market-distorting direct subsidies and export
subsidies.)
226. Laurence Lessig, A Taste of Our Own Poison: A modest proposal: Hold
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fund," 228 and corn subsidies have come under fire from a number of
229
prominent right-libertarian organizations. Similarly, opposition from
liberal and progressive organizations is increasingly vocal and has
coalesced around the subsidies' environmental impact, the unintended
healthcare consequences, and the fact that the nation's wealthiest
corporations receive a disproportionate share of governmental subsidies.230
Even the powerful Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, which represents 99
231
Iowa counties, no longer supports federal direct payments to farmers.
What can possibly explain the persistence of such a harmful and unpopular
law?
Legislative drift-the process by which legislation grows out-of-
touch with its original purposes-and lobbying activities among vested
stakeholders are central to any honest answer to this question. Emergency
subsidies made sense as measures to stabilize prices and the supply of corn
and other grains during the Great Depression and the shortages of the
1970s. But through a combination of a lack of general political will and the
dedicated lobbying of vested interest groups, these emergency measures
have become ingrained in our bureaucracies and national administrative
practices. The conditions under which this legislation was passed continue
diverging from the environmental and public health realities we now
confront. Despite the bill's ever-escalating irrelevance to our current
societal predicaments, the USDA, EPA, FDA, and other agencies-and
increasingly Congress itself-are hamstrung in their ability to eliminate or
modify our system of crop subsidization and its consequences in
accordance with reasonable and widely shared public policy objectives.
Lobbying and campaign finance rules have played a vital role in propping
up this broken system. As historian Burton Folsom wrote, the subsidy
survived, "[n]ot because it worked well, but because farmers lobbied to
228. Mark Bittman, Opinion, Don't End Agricultural Subsidies, Fix Them, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/dont-end-
agricultural-subsidies-fix-them/.
229. See Michael Tanner, Republicans are Weak on Farm Subsidies, CATO
INSTITUTE, (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary
/republicans-are-weak-farm-subsidies; Ryan McMaken, A few ways that governments
distort food markets, LuDwIG VON MISES INSTITUTE: MISES ECONOMICS BLOG (Feb. 21,
2012), http://blog.mises.org/21130/a-few-ways-that-governments-distort-food-markets/.
230. See, e.g. Eubanks, supra note 156, at 233 (citing IMHOFF, supra note 219, at 33).
231. See Dan Piller, Iowa Farm Bureau: end direct payments, DES MOINES REGISTER




keep it." 23 2 President George W. Bush actually threatened to veto the most
recent Farm Bill in 2008 for unfairly redistributing tax money and
distorting public trade, but the Senate rejected subsidy caps and responded
to the veto threat with a 79-14 vote in favor of the existing form.233
Incidents such as this give rise to a serious concern that senators'
dependence on campaign contributions and lobbying money matters more
than the policy preferences of their constituency and even more than party
loyalties.
The persistence of this legislation can actually shine some light into
the most intractable problems in the current functioning of our political and
governmental institutions. A clear understanding of these political and
structural problems is necessary to address the ways that the United States
props up its broken agricultural sector, and perhaps more importantly, to
begin effectively organizing the interests affected. By drawing attention to
the fragmented structures through which farm policy is created and
implemented, this Part of the article is meant to highlight the structural
barriers that preclude more effective and public-interested policy-making in
the areas of food and agricultural policy. A particular emphasis is placed
on explaining how fragmentation increases the number of points of
influence that lobbyists have and thereby makes it easier for special
interests and industry experts to lobby more effectively than less-informed
members of the public.
While admittedly the concerns addressed in the following Sections
are interrelated, this analysis is divided into three parts. Part A addresses
the narrowness of the statutory authority given to the relevant agencies in
order to implement food policy and the coordination problems that
regulatory balkanization has produced in this area. Part B considers the
structural features of Congress, including the Congressional committee
system, which, in the context of Farm Bill legislation, lead to the
overrepresentation of the concerns of the agricultural sector at the expense
of the public health, environmental, and other economic considerations.
Part C postulates that lobbying and campaign fund-raising, taken in
conjunction with the other structural features of Congress have made
effective legislation in this area less probable.
232. Burton Folsom, Jr., F.D.R. 's Disastrous Experiment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/21/do-farm-
subsidies-protect-national-security/fdrs-disastrous-experiment.
233. See Bjerga, supra note 109.
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A. Agency Fragmentation, Regulatory Capture, & the Illusion of a Food
Policy
For at least a century, one major fixture of the U.S. food agricultural
regulatory systems has been its highly balkanized structure.
Responsibilities are split between the USDA, the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
numerous other state and federal agencies. By one measure, the food
safety system alone is "composed of fifteen federal agencies that work
under thirty foundational statutes."234 Extensive balkanization introduces
collective action and coordination problems and makes legislating and
regulating in this area more difficult.23 5 In the context of subsidies, Farm
Bills and the related authorizing statutes often limit agency discretion,
making it burdensome or impossible for an agency like the USDA, for
example, to take healthcare costs or environmental factors into account in
determining how subsidy payments could more effectively be allocated.236
234. Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn't Enough?, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1345-46 (2007) (citing INST. OF MED., NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 85 (1998)). See
also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-549T 1, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM: OVERSEEING THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN
TO REDUCE OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, 1 (2005) (statement
of Robert A. Robinson, Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05549t.pdf; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-04-588T 18, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, FEDERAL FOOD
SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM: FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING Is NEEDED To
ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP, 18, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets
/120/110801 .pdf (noting that several former high-ranking food safety officials support
the consolidation of food safety activities); Stuart M. Pape et al., Food Security Would
Be Compromised by Combining the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S.
Department ofAgriculture into a Single Food Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 405
(2004) ("There is a recurring debate in Washington, D.C., regarding the necessity of
combining the food regulatory functions of the Food and Drug Administration ... and
the meat and poultry regulatory functions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture . . .
into a single food agency. . . . FDA practitioners have long viewed this debate as never-
ending and virtually immune to outside forces and the vagaries of the political
process."); Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Too Many Chefs in
the Food-Safety Kitchen? (Oct. 7, 2004), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/
200410071.html (discussing legislation that would have combined the USDA and the
FDA).
235. See generally, Frederick J. Lee, Global Institutional Choice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
328 (2010).
236. See GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 2084, FARM
COMMODITY PROGRAMS: A SHORT PRIMER (2002) (discussing the scope of USDA
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Although some commentators have pointed out the benefits of regulatory
specialization, fragmentation has been a recurring source of criticisms since
237the USDA and FDA were first separated in 1940.
The balkanized and fragmented structure of the food regulatory
system has been cited as a major impediment to effective government
action and to the development of more reasonable food policy.238  The
administrative structure of our government has partitioned agricultural
policy, energy policy, environmental policy, and healthcare policy across
several agencies and has provided insufficient resolution or coordination
mechanisms. Even more remarkably, a single issue can often be spread
over multiple agencies in a baroque, almost indecipherable manner.23 9 This
issue is analogous to one THE WASHINGTON POST helped expose during its
2010 report titled Top Secret America, which showed that in the realm of
national security there existed "over 45 organizations [that] could be
broken down into 1,271 sub-units." 2 40 Even though the situation in the
realms of agricultural, food, and health policy is not quite as drastic,
fragmented agency structures make coordinated or collective decision-
making more difficult, time-consuming, and costly throughout the federal
government. 24 1 The practice of splintering responsibility and treating
statutorily required support programs and USDA Discretionary Support programs
under Section 32 of P.L. 320, a 1935 law).
237. See, e.g. Helena Bottemiller, GAO: Food Safety Fragmentation Needs to be
Fixed, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/03/
gao-food-safety-fragmenation-needs-addressed/ (summarizing a recent report by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office noting Opportunities to Reduce Potential
Duplication in Government Programs. The GAO report and press release are available
here: http://www.gao.gov/ereport/GAO- 11-318SP/data_center/Agriculture/Fragmented
food safetysystem has causedinconsistentoversight,_ineffective coordination, a
nd inefficient use of resources.
238. See Mike King, Seal Cracks in Food Safety System, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 7,
2006, at A14; U.S. Needs a Single Agency to Administer a Unified, Risk-Based
Inspection System: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Government
Affairs, U.S. Senate, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/T-RCED-99-256 2 (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99256t.pdf; Reforming the Food
Safety System, supra note 234 at 1345-46.
239. Consider, for example, that the food safety system alone is "composed of fifteen
federal agencies that work under thirty foundational statutes." Reforming the Food
Safety System, supra note 234 at 1345-46 (citations omitted).
240. See Methodology and Credits, Top Secret America: A Washington Post
Investigation, WASH. PosT (July 2010), available at http://projects.washingtonpost.com
/top-secret-america/articles/methodology/.
241. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 1-318SP, REPORT
TO CONGRESSIONAL ADDRESSEES, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE POTENTIAL DUPLICATION
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interrelated and overlapping issues as though they were discrete issues
produces inconsistency across agencies, duplicates activities, and increases
coordination costs. This diminishes accountability, and more subtly, it
places blinders around administrators and limits the possible factors and
courses of action that any one agency can take into consideration.242
A cross-agency resolution mechanism would offer one possible fix, 2 43
but such an approach would likely encounter administrative law problems
and, to the extent that considerable power were transferred, would likely
face resistance in Congress. Alternatively, Congress could, as a number of
scholars and organizations have recommended in the context of food-safety
laws, consolidate agency responsibility into a single food-regulatory entity
that is capable of making the necessary policy determinations and taking
the necessary steps toward effective implementation. 244 In early 2012,
President Obama laid out a proposal for the consolidation of six trade
agencies that emphasized that combining agencies could reduce costs,
improve services, streamline bureaucratic redundancies, and enable
IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE REVENUE (2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf (identifying fragmented
agency structures and their negative effects).
242. See id.; see also FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY: WHO DOES WHAT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-lB, FOOD
SAFETY AND QUALITY: WHO DOES WHAT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 4 (1990).
243. Compare the criticisms that were made of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 (2009), which contains representatives from fifteen
government entities. See, e.g. Robert Cook, Director, Division of Trading and Markets
on behalf of Mary L. Schapiro, Chariman, Securities and Exchange Comm'n,
Testimony on the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Apr. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts041411rc.htm ("[A]s Dodd-Frank
implementation proceeds, the coordination of the FSOC agencies will continue to be a
vital consideration.").
244. In the context of food safety laws, see Stuart M. Pape et al., Food Security
Would Be Compromised by Combining the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S.
Department ofAgriculture into a Single Food Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 405
(2004); Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Too Many Chefs in the
Food-Safety Kitchen? (Oct. 7, 2004). C.f. Reforming the Food Safety System: What if
Consolidation Isn't Enough?, supra note 234 at 1345-46. Compare the calls and
proposals for consolidation of financial regulation consolidation following the recent
2008 financial crisis. For an introduction to this debate, see Howell Jackson, A
Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the




agencies to focus on their primary purposes.245 Another approach would be
to follow the model of statutes such as NEPA, as described above, and
mandate that agencies consult and take into account certain relevant factors
before proceeding with their implementation strategies.246 NEPA requires
that environmental considerations be taken into account by all government
agencies, but as litigation has revealed, courts have interpreted such
statutes as a procedural requirement like those imposed under the
Administrative Procedure Act247 and not as a guarantee of any substantive
248outcome. In other words, even if the USDA conducted a full
environmental impact analysis of its subsidy programs under NEPA like Le
Seur and Abelkop propose,249 it would impose no substantive legal
requirement to desist from any of the environmental harms it identified.250
At present, there is no requirement that the USDA take into account the
back-end healthcare costs that are created through its existing commodity
programs, but if NEPA litigation offers any guidance, such a requirement
would have to assume a different statutory framework.
This problem of fragmentation is not a product of the agencies
themselves so much as the authorizing statutes that delimit how
responsibility is divided among agencies and even how responsibilities are
divided within a single agency. The USDA's statutory scheme, for
instance, has resulted in the separation of nutrition guidelines from subsidy
administration. The statutory obligations and subsequent agency
subdivisions reinforce somewhat arbitrary divisions even within the agency
itself. As Michael Pollan has noted, these internal divides require the
agency to regulate at cross-purposes with itself.251 Administrative law
serves as a further limitation on agency discretion.252 Rachel Barkow, in
245. See Laura Meckler, White House Seeks to Merge Agencies, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020454240457715836183489
4658.html.
246. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text; National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332 (2006).
247. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 (2010).
248. See Calvert Cliffs v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (DC Cir.
1971); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978); Lemon v. Harvey, 448 F.Supp.2d 97, 104 (D.D.C.2006).
249. See La Seur and Abelkop, supra note 194 at 211-16.
250. See Lemon, 448 F.Supp.2d at 104 (holding that preparation of a supplementary
impact statement pursuant to NEPA would not "force defendants to alter their allegedly
injurious course of action here."). See also Carrie Lowry La Seur and Adam D.K.
Abelkop, supra note 194 at 224-25.
251. Pollan, supra note 2.
252. It is important to note that there is no reason to assume greater administrative
discretion would yield better policy results in this area. Given some of the other factors
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her article, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, argues that, "the rise of the administrative state has made
unchecked discretion an anomaly in the law, and a phenomenon to be
viewed with suspicion."253 In other words, the rise of the administrative
state is a story of empowering a large government entity to regulate in the
public interest while at the same time constricting their decision-making
abilities through judicial oversight and narrow statutory interpretation.2 54
Another of the largest problems posed by a fragmented agency system
is that it presents a large number of influence points where industry and
special interest pressure can be exerted. And it is a much easier task for
companies with a stronger financial stake in regulatory decision-making to
keep up with influence points and technical questions than average
members of the voting public. 2 5 5 To give an example: one of the greatest
challenges to the USDA's ability to implement effective food policy comes
from the agency's dependence on and connections to the industrial entities
it is charged with overseeing. Regulatory capture, a term used by public
choice economists to describe the situation in which a government
regulatory agency implemented to act in the public interest instead
advances the economic interests and special interests of the industry it is
charged with regulating.25 6 This problem is sometimes referred to as
"client politics," which "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a
program go to some single, reasonably small interest (an industry,
identified, such as regulatory capture, there are highly plausible arguments to be made
that enhanced discretion could in fact contribute further to market distortions and the
other problems identified throughout this paper.
253. Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (2008).
254. See id. at 1335.
255. See generally Michael E. Levine and Jennifer L Forrence, Regulatory Capture,
Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. LAW, ECON. AND
ORGANIZATION (1990); Ezra Klein, Our Corrupt Politics: It's Not All Money, NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2012/mar/22/our-corrupt-politics-its-not-all-money/?pagination=false
("The lobbyists are smart and personable and interesting and connected. They have
expertise [the politician] needs, and connections that can help him, and information
about what other political actors are doing that gives him a leg up. It is a perfect
mixture of ideological comradeship, financial perks, and personal affinity.").
256. See, e.g., Fr6ddric Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited-Lessons from the




profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large
number of people (for example, all taxpayers)." 2 5 7
A number of charges of regulatory capture at the USDA were made in
the wake of the 2004 mad cow disease scare when the USDA refused to
require industry-wide testing and even went so far as to ban a willing beef
producer from testing his cattle for the disease. 258 The Wall Street Journal
similarly speculated that industry pressures are responsible for the failure
of the USDA under President Obama to require an environmental impact
statement to consider the impact of its decision to permit the planting of
genetically modified alfalfa.2 5 9 Another recurrent complaint about the
USDA has been its inability to articulate dietary guidelines that address the
severity of the obesity epidemic facing this country given the weight of
industry pressure on the agency's rulemaking process. 260 A recent study by
the Harvard School of Public Health observed that the 2010 Dietary
Guidelines were a considerable improvement over previous USDA
publications, but that they still failed to reflect the scientific consensus
about what a healthy diet entails. 26 1 The researchers see this failure as
likely related to the role that "powerful food industry groups-the Grocery
Manufacturers Association, the Sugar Association, the National Milk
Producers Federation, and the National Cattleman's Beef Association,
among them," play during the USDA's scientific review process and during
public hearings. 2 62
With respect to commodity subsidies, the conflict of interest extends
past the simple fact that a considerable number of USDA employees
depend on the existence of subsidies for their own jobs. To the extent that
257. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY Do IT 76 (1989).
258. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., U.S. Won't Let Company Test All Its Cattle for Mad
Cow, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/10/us/
us-won-t-let-company-test-all-its-cattle-for-mad-cow.html.
259. See Holman Jenkins, Let's Restart the Green Revolution: Food prices are up,
and output and productivity is falling behind Not enough attention is being placed on
regulation-induced stagnation, WALL ST. J., Feb 11, 2011, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703445904576118020915591658.html.
260. See, e.g., MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY
INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH (2d ed. 2007).
261. See The Nutrition Source: New U.S. Dietary Guidelines: Progress, Not
Perfection, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
nutritionsource/what-should-you-eat/dietary-guidelines-20 I 0/index.html; Marion
Nestle, The 2010 Dietary Guidelines: Enjoy your food, but eat less!, FOOD POLITICS
BLOG (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.foodpolitics.com/201 1/01/the-2010-
dietary-guidelines-enjoy-your-food-but-eat-less/.
262. See The Nutrition Source, supra note 261.
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the USDA has discretion over the administration and delivery of
commodity subsidies, industry representatives likewise have a considerable
role in influencing agency determinations, both during public hearings,263
through the submission of industry-funded findings, and through wide-
scale media campaigns, such as the rather infamous Sweet Surprise
campaign of the Corn Refiners Association.264 Because representatives
from the USDA regularly have the opportunity to partake in the drafting of
Farm Bill legislation and occasionally appear before Congress regarding its
authorizing statutes, their willingness to testify adversely to the interests of
their clientele, particularly when their agency's jobs are potentially at stake,
creates a conflict of interest that jeopardizes the possibility that the USDA
will ever support food policies that serve the broader public's nutritional
needs.
B. Congressional Committees & the Illusion that Farm Bills only Affect
Farming
There are a number of structural features of Congress that help
explain the unpopular Farm Bills' remarkable persistence. The corn
subsidy served a useful public purpose when it was first passed, but the
process of legislative drift has allowed subsidy administration to develop in
one direction while the background economy develops in another.
However, the Farm Bill presents a special case. This bill has to be actively
reauthorized by Congress every five years, so the simple process of
changing background conditions cannot fully explain what is going on.
There is a great deal of political inertia surrounding the Farm Bill, in part
because its deleterious effects have not been overwhelmingly borne by any
single interest group, but also because the bill, despite its relative
unpopularity, has never engaged or mobilized the larger population
sufficiently to catalyze its repeal or to stop its recurring reauthorization.
This Section identifies several structural aspects of the U.S. legislative
process that enable the type of interest group overrepresentation, which is
the topic of Section C. The breakdown that leads to the continued
legislative renewal of the Farm Bill every five years actually reveals a
263. See, e.g., Ben Tucker, Can't Keep 'Em Down on the Farm Bill, THE COLLEGE
HILL INDEPENDENT (Apr. 9, 2011), http://students.brown.edu/CollegeHill
Independent/?p=4660 (discussing the lack of broad public participation at public
hearings).





deeply entrenched and unnecessary corporate welfare regime and in many
ways reveals how out of touch our current political system is at responding
to the problems facing our country. Not only can Congress not address
problems, it cannot even stop actively funding the ones it creates and
perpetuates.
The congressional committee system contributes to the problem in
several ways as well. Like the compartmentalization and balkanization
problems affecting the agencies charged with the administration of Farm
Bill legislation, Congressional committees face coordination problems and
arbitrary divisions of responsibility. A single committee is often charged
with drafting and revising the majority of the Farm Bill. Although
eventually the full legislative body will have a chance to propose revisions
and ultimately vote on the bill, the interests of the drafting committee,
typically the agricultural committee with the strongest economic ties to
farm states, tend to predominate through to the bills' final versions.2 65
These problems are rendered more significant by the fact that the Farm Bill
is largely viewed-by both representatives and their constituents alike-as
purely agricultural legislation and not, more accurately, as affecting the
health, welfare, and environmental interests of a broad cross-section of
Americans.
The Senate, for example, has separate committees for Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry; Appropriations; Energy and Natural Resources;
Environment and Public Works; Health, Education, Labor and Pensions.266
Although these committees, and certainly others not listed here, may have
interests deeply connected to a broad conception of food and agricultural
policy, Farm Bill legislation is entrusted to the Agricultural
Committees. 26 7_ The broken Senate rules, such as the overuse of the
filibuster and secret holds, along with the near-absence of debate on the
Senate floor, make this deliberative and representative failure even more
acute.
The process of assigning Farm Bill legislation to the House and
Senate Agricultural Committees, compounded by popular
misunderstandings about the bill's effects, effectively shields the bill from
the kind of debates that the United States needs to have. Michael Pollan
has expressed this concern quite powerfully:
265. See Farm Bill, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION &
FORESTRY, http://www.ag.senate.gov/issues/farm-bill/ (last visited June 18, 2012).
266. See United States Senate Committees Home, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d-threesections-with-teasers/committ
ees home.htm (last visited June 18, 2012).
267. See id; Farm Bill, supra note 265.
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[Y]ou would think the farm-bill debate would engage the
nation's political passions every five years, but that hasn't
been the case. If the quintennial antidrama of the "farm
bill debate" holds true to form this year, a handful of farm-
state legislators will thrash out the mind-numbing details
behind closed doors, with virtually nobody else, either in
Congress or in the media, paying much attention. Why?
Because most of us assume that true to its name, the farm
bill is about "farming," an increasingly quaint activity that
involves no one we know and in which few of us think we
have a stake. This leaves our own representatives free to
ignore the farm bill, to treat it as a parochial piece of
legislation affecting a handful of their Midwestern
colleagues. Since we aren't paying attention, they pay no
political price for trading or even selling their farm-bill
votes. The fact that the bill is deeply encrusted with
incomprehensible jargon and prehensile programs dating
back to the 1930s makes it almost impossible for the
average legislator to understand the bill should he or she
try to, much less the average citizen. It's doubtful this is
1 68an accident.
The committee system has also made it possible for private sector lobbyists
to target fewer representatives and to frame their interests more narrowly,
far more narrowly than the scope of issues in the public interest affected by
agricultural legislation. A recent study by The Center for Responsive
Politics and THE FISCAL TIMES found, in the words of one journalist, that
"[m]embers of many influential committees receive a disproportionate
share of their campaign contributions from people and corporate political
action committees with business before them."2 6 9
The more general problem, beyond its enabling effect on special
interests, is that the committee structure creates a veto point270 and gives a
268. Pollan, supra note 2.
269. Michael Beckel, It's Official: Corporate Lobbyists Target Campaigns Of Key
Committee Members, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2011), available at
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-04-14/politics/30017708 1_committees-
contributions-campaign. See OpenSecrets.org / Fiscal Times Investigation Reveals
Intimate Ties Among Congressional Committees, Special Interests, OPEN SECRETS
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/04/opensecrets-fiscaltimes-
joint-project-announcement.html.
270. See generally Thomas H. Hammond, Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and
Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems, in George A. Krause and Kenneth J.
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narrow subset of legislators the ability to make determinations that extend
far beyond their intended purview. In March of 2011, for example, the
House Agricultural Committee, in an effort to reduce the Congressional
budget, endorsed a letter supporting cuts in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), which helps low-income Americans purchase
food.271 A record 46.5 million Americans received SNAP in December of
201 1.272 Given the ways in which the committee system makes targeted
campaign contributions and lobbying easier, it is perhaps unsurprising that
the House Agricultural Committee indicated that it would rather cut SNAP
than cut automatic subsidies to farms.273 These are precisely the deals that
the committee structure helps broker. As Michael Pollan has noted, "[i]t's
an old story: the 'hunger lobby' gets its food stamps so long as the farm
lobby can have its subsidies." 274 Although the largest single expenditure
under the 2010 Farm Bill did go to fund nutrition programs like SNAP,2 75
such large-scale determinations about entitlement cuts to basic nutrition
programs are not the sort of decisions that a handful of legislators should
decide for the entire country without greater Congressional deliberation.
And absent the structural pressure to engage in a more comprehensive
"farm bill debate," the possibility of an overhaul in federal food policy
remains unlikely.
C. Lobbyists, Interest Groups, & the Illusion ofPublic Choice
As described in the preceding paragraphs, the breadth of issues
impacted by the Farm Bill sits somewhat awkwardly with the fact that such
Meier, eds., POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC
STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY, (2003), available at http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/
0472113178-ch4.pdf (discussing veto points and how they impede policy changes).
271. Press Release, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives,
Agriculture Committee Adopts Budget Letter (Mar. 15, 2011), available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewslD=1340.
272. SNAP/Food Stamp Participation, FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER (2011),
http://frac.org/reports-and-resources/snapfood-stamp-monthly-participation-data/.
273. See Tim Feinholz, Ag Committee Supports Cuts to Food Assistance, Not Farm
Subsidies, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL (Mar. 21, 2011), http://nationaljournal.com/ag-
committee-supports-cuts-to-food-assistance-not-farm-subsidies-20110321.
274. Michael Pollan, Weed It and Reap, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 4, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/opinion/04pollan.html?_r I &pagewanted=al 1.
275. See Lynne Finnerty, Cutting Farm Programs Would be a Pyrrhic Victory,
AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION (June 27, 2011), http://www.fb.org/index.php
?action=newsroom.focus&year2011&file=fo0627.html ("Nutrition programs, on the
other hand, have grown, accounting for a whopping 80 percent of the farm bill in 2010,
compared to 52 percent in 2002.").
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a limited subdivision of Congress exercises such disproportionate influence
over the bill's drafting. The Agricultural Committee is dominated by
members of Congress from farm states, which carries serious implications
for the interest group politics of the Farm Bill. There is no traditional
partisan split that sustains the agricultural subsidy regime, and as
previously discussed, subsidies have vocal critics on both sides of
America's political divide. The problem is, rather, one of legislative and
276regulatory capture, and there is considerable evidence that private farm
sector lobbying affects both Republicans and Democrats alike. As Tim
Feinholz reported, House Agricultural Committee Chairman Frank Lucas
(R-OK) has reported $445,714 in political contributions from the
agricultural industry over the course of his career, and ranking Democrat
Collin Peterson (D-MN) has reported $809,097 in agricultural sector
donations.277
According to standard public choice and public interest theories of
economic regulation, Congressional action should be expected to correct
for market failures and externalities and to establish corrective measures
within areas of activities unreachable by market forces.2 7 8 As a practical
matter, however, costs that are dispersed over large areas or disaggregated
groups of individuals receive disproportionately less representation when
compared to cohesive, well-defined economic interests. Farming
legislation is no exception. In fact, the Farm Bill offers a powerful
illustration of the limits of public interest and public choice theories of
legislation within our current legislative system. The reason the Farm Bill
offers such a powerful example is that, unlike many issues where liberal
and conservative legislators disagree considerably over what policies are in
the "public interest," agricultural subsidies have few political defenders on
either side of the aisle. Rather than act as a rational economic actor to
correct for externalities, such as the environmental and healthcare costs the
bill exacerbates, Congress continues to actively fund and perpetuate them
through subsidies that free-market advocates find objectionable. Public
276. Matt Yglesias, Embracing Regulatory Capture, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 4 2011),
http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/2011/01 /embracing-regulatory-capture/ (describing the
process of "regulatory capture" affecting Congress, a phenomenon "wherein private
interests seize control of the policymaking apparatus for their own interests").
277. Feinholz, supra note 273.
278. See generally Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, BELL J. OF
ECON., v5(2), 335 (1974); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA.
L. REV. 339 (1988); RICHARD CORNES AND TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996).
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choice accounts of legislation cannot adequately explain the Farm Bill's
persistence.
The more general failure of public interested legislation in recent
decades can be understood as a breakdown in one of the United States'
most fundamental mechanisms for collective action.279 Senators and
Congresspersons, taken individually, have enormous economic pressure to
fundraise,280 and well-financed special interest groups, particularly with a
direct financial stake in legislative outcomes, can help them meet their
individual targets to an extent that the more diffuse public cannot. Thus,
rather than aggregating voter preferences or addressing problems that
impact broad but uncoordinated members of the public, legislators'
individual incentives will often diverge systematically from the interests of
their constituents or even legislators' own policy preferences. Consistent
with interest group models of economic regulation,28 ' individual incentives
of legislators give rise to market-like competition among interest groups
hoping to secure votes, and as result, collective action solutions are
impaired.282 Signals from constituents about their conception of a public
good become simply one among many competing considerations a
legislator seeking reelection may respond to. As a practical matter, interest
groups, community organizations, nonprofits, corporations, consumers, and
other entities seeking to advance more public-interested regulatory
platforms still organize and form mechanisms for exerting pressure on
legislators. But beyond the collective action difficulties facing these
diffuse interest groups lies the more intractable barrier: the economic
incentives faced by individual legislators can preclude legislators from
voting in accordance with even with their own conception of the public
interest. With such incentive structures in place, concerted industry
lobbying and the absence of a concentrated public interest lobbying group
279. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
280. See Alica M. Cohn, Sen. Durbin: Amount of time Senate spends fundraising
would shock Americans, THE HILL (March 30, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/219269-sen-durbin-amount-of-time-senate-spends-fundraising-
would-shock-americans.
281. See generally Posner, supra note 278; Robert D. Tollison, Regulation and
Interest Groups, in REGULATION, 59-76 (ed. Jack High, 1991); Geoffrey S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, QUARTERLY J.
OF ECON. 98: 371 (August 1983).
282. See generally Robert V. Percival, Environmental Legislation and the Problem of
Collective Action, 9 DUKE ENVIRON. L. & POL'Y FORUM 9-28, 20-26 (Fall 1998),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 182
&context=delpf (discussing how this has been evidenced in environmental legislation).
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to counteract that influence have imperiled the possibility that public
choice mechanisms will operate to produce public goods or, more
modestly, reduce the number of non-Pareto-improving market
interventions.2 83
This breakdown can be seen by looking at interest groups'
interactions with legislators and then observing the legislative compromises
that emerge. Lobbying and our system of privately funded political
campaigns are essential to any an explanation for America's inability to
legislate, particularly regarding issues such as corn subsidies where the
public welfare interests run counter to a concentrated and articulate
corporate interest. As Barbara Atwell wrote, "[o]ne of the likely obstacles
to reforming America's weight problem is the food industry itself. The
politics of food cannot be underestimated." 2 84 Nutrition expert and New
York University Professor Marion Nestle made a similar observation
during a recent interview with National Public Radio (NPR): "[t]he other
source of corruption, of course, is the way we fund election campaigns. As
long as corporations are funding the campaigns of our congressional
representatives, we're not going to get laws passed that favor public health.
Our laws are going to continue to favor corporate health." 285
Without even needing to allege that any illegal corruption transpired
or that quid pro quo campaign contributions were exchanged for the
continued support of subsidy payments, the problems inherent in this
design nonetheless disrupt public choice and effective representation in the
public interest. Scholars have noted that even legally permissible forms of
lobbying influence undermine the legitimacy of our democratic
representative institutions.28 6 The perception of corruption likewise
undermines democratic trust and has been cited as a major reason to reform
existing campaign finance restrictions2 8 7 and served as a compelling state
283. See P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Herakles Polemarchakis, Pareto improving
price regulation when the asset market is incomplete (Dept. of Economics, Yale
University, Working Paper No. 01-31, 2001), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/
seminars/microtlmt03/polemarchakis-030305.pdf ("Price regulation, which operates
anonymously, on market variables, can be such a Pareto improving policy, even when
the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account.").
284. Atwell, supra note 168, at 17 (citations omitted).
285. Interview with Marion Nestle, National Public Radio, Jan. 20, 2011, Can Wal-
Mart Change America's Eating Habits?, available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/20/
133091250/Can-Wal-Mart-Change-Americas-Eating-Habits.
286. See, e.g., Laurence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOSTON REVIEW,
Sept./Oct. 2010, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR35.5/lessig.php.
287. See Jacob Sullum, The Appearance of Corruption, REASON MAGAZINE, Dec.
2010, available at http://reason.com/archives/2010/11/30/the-appearance-of-corruption
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interest in the Supreme Court's First Amendment since Buckley v. Valeo.288
The improved access that lobbyists have to legislators, the financial
dependencies that legislators develop on their largest campaign
contributors, and the subtle ways in which contributions foster more
favorable impressions among legislators together undermine the
representative process that serves as the premise of our legislative system
of government. Absent these influences, it would be difficult to
comprehend how harmful, unpopular legislation like the commodity
subsidies within the Farm Bill would persist or even came to pass in the
first place.
Lobbying from agricultural companies is considerable. When taken
alongside the committee system and the large influence that several
Midwestern representatives exert over agricultural policy, even modest
industry contributions when properly targeted can have a significant effect.
At the time of the 1973 deregulatory move within agriculture, which was
spearheaded by then Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, subsidies primarily
benefitted a handful of large companies such as Cargill and ADM, which
came to dominate the high-fructose corn syrup industry.289 As Charles
Krafoff wrote, "it wasn't precisely a windfall, since ADM had done a great
deal to engineer this outcome." 290 It is no coincidence that Butz's free
market rhetoric and admonition to "get big or get out" aligned so closely
with the interests of the nation's largest commodity producers. 2 9 1 Cargill
(noting that John McCain made eliminating the appearance of corruption a part of his
2000 campaign and when advocating for the eventual passage of the McCain-Feingold
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, stating for example, "[i]t's the appearance
that's just as important.").
288. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) see also, Thomas Burke, The Concept of
Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 127 (1997), available
at http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/tb/finlaw.html (stating that Buckley v. Valeo held
"that only society's interest in preventing 'corruption and the appearance of corruption'
outweighed the limits on free expression created by limits on campaign contributions
and expenditures").
289. See The Facts Behind King Corn, supra 65, at 1-2.
290. Chip Krakoff, Starvation, Obesity, and Corporate Welfare: Archer Daniels
Midland and U.S. Policy, EMERGING MARKETS OUTLOOK (Oct, 13, 2010), available at
http://www.emergingmarketsoutlook.com/?p=1469 (describing ADM's electioneering
activities from the late 1960s through 2009).
291. The following passage is instructive and suggests ADM did far more than issue
public statements favoring the administration's deregulatory policies: "During the
Watergate Investigation, Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox indicted then-ADM CEO
Dwayne Andreas for giving $100,000 in illegal contributions to Hubert Humphrey's
1968 Presidential campaign. But Andreas was nothing if not bipartisan. Richard
Nixon's secretary Rose Mary Woods, testified that during Nixon's 1972 campaign
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and ADM had actually advocated publicly with Butz and the Farm Bureau
for selective deregulatory policies and liberalized international trade
292policies. Nor is it surprising that the largest industrial growers were the
primary beneficiaries of governmental subsidies and saw persistent
293increases in market share since their implementation, despite a major
purported rationale for the subsidy being to support small-scale, family-
owned farms.294 Consider the following 2008 graph from the USDA
Economic Research Service, which indicates that while commercial farms
constituted only 12% of farms in the U.S. they received an impressive and
disproportionate 62% of government agricultural payments:
Andreas handed her an envelope containing $100,000 in $100 bills. Between 1975 and
1977 Andreas gave $72,000 in ADM stock to the children of David Gartner, senator
Humphrey's chief of staff at the time, whom President Jimmy Carter in 1977 named to
head the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (he was later forced to resign when
the details of the ADM gift came to light)." Id.
292. See Id; The Facts Behind King Corn, supra note 65, at 1; Philpott, Food First,
supra note 69.
293. Alan Bjerga, Most U.S. Farm Subsidies Go to 10% of Recipients, Group Says,
BLOOMBERG, (May 4, 2010) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-04/almost-two-
thirds-of-u-s-farm-aid-goes-to-10-of-recipients-group-says.html; Hassebrook, supra
note 15 ("When the Center for Rural Affairs analyzed Agriculture Department
spending, we found that the U.S.D.A. spent twice as much subsidizing the 20 largest
farms in each of 13 leading farm states as it spent on rural development (business and
entrepreneurial development, housing and infrastructure).").
294. See, e.g., id ("Some elected officials who crow the loudest about cutting
unnecessary spending seem to be among the most vociferous defenders of unlimited
subsidies to the nation's largest farms. The hypocrisy on this issue, however, is not
limited to Republican budget hawks. Many Democrats who wrap themselves in
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Contributions from major agricultural interests have shown little sign
of abating. According to the nonprofit Public Campaign, "[o]ver the past
12 years, the industry has spent $1.5 billion on lobbying and campaign
contributions at the federal level." 2 96 As Laurence Lessig recently noted in
a talk calling for reforms to America's campaign finance system,
"companies that build on corn spend millions of dollars to continue to get
government subsidies for corn." 297 Other researchers have observed that it
is not only growers, but also food producers and manufacturers who
depend on cheap and abundant corn-derived products such as high-fructose
corn syrup, who are lobbying for the continuation of subsidies that prevent
the actual costs of agricultural production from being borne by
businesses.298 ADM, a major recipient of the private benefits conferred
through corn subsidies, 299 has continued to donate generously to a number
of presidential and senatorial campaigns and sponsored the 2008
Democratic National Convention.300  According to ADM's website on
295. Farm and Commodity Policy: Government Payments and the Farm Sector: Who
Benefits and How Much?, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE BRIEFING RooM
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/gov-pay.htm.
296. Adam Smith, Campaign Cash, It's What's for Dinner, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN (Jan.
11, 2011), http://www.publicampaign.org/blog/2011/01/27/campaign-cash-its-whats-
for-dinner.
297. Presentation of Laurence Lessig, supra note 122.
298. See Christine Spolar and Joseph Eaton, Food Lobby Mobilizes, As Soda Tax
Bubbles Up, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009
/11/04/soda-tax-mobilizes-food-I n 345840.html.
299. See Bovard, supra note 147.
300. Chip Krakoff, supra note 290.
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corporate responsibility, the company's stated philosophy on political
contributions is the following:
ADM and ADMPAC, a political action committee funded
by our employees' voluntary contributions, therefore
support candidates for political office and organizations
that share our pro-growth vision, our aspirations for the
future of global agriculture, and our commitment to the
people who depend on it for their lives and livelihoods.
We strongly believe that this political activity is in the best
interests of our stockholders, customers and employees.30 1
In 2010, ADM Corporate gave $340,750 in federal and state campaigns,
and ADMPAC gave another $183 ,000.302
Subsidies are not the only aspect of farming legislation that lobbyists
have taken an interest in. Other efforts to correct for imbalances resulting
from these price supports have been similarly impeded. Lawrence Lessig
also observed that the sugar industry has taken an approach that unwittingly
complements the corn lobby to the detriment of the public's health by
seeking tariffs and legislation that will keep the cost of cane sugar
artificially high, a practice that helped entrench high-fructose corn syrup in
the American diet.303 THE WASHINGTON POST reported that "[d]uring the
2004 election cycle, two Florida sugar companies gave a total of $925,000
to election coffers."304 Consider the following passage from Barbara
Atwell's paper on the healthcare costs of America's de facto food policy:
The food industry has also been proactive in its efforts to
ensure that the tobacco litigation experience will not be
repeated in the food industry.. . . Lobbying is taking place
to urge states to enact laws that prevent lawsuits for
personal injuries related to obesity. These "commonsense
consumption" laws would place accountability for obesity
301. 2011 Corporate Responsibility Report - U.S. Political Contributions, ADM,
http://www.adm.com/en-US/responsibility/201 1CR/Pages/politicalspending.aspx (last
visited April 5, 2011).
302. Id.
303. See Julian Brookes, Lawrence Lessig on How Money Corrupts Congress - and
How to Stop It, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE, Oct. 5, 2011, available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national-affairs/lawrence-lessig-on-how-
money-corrupts-congress-and-how-to-stop-it-20111005.




on the consumer, making it more difficult to sue food
manufacturers. . . . A number of advocacy groups, in
particular, the National Restaurant Association, have
advocated for this legislation.305
Because of the diversity of special interests clamoring to influence laws
pertaining to agricultural and dietary issues, the resulting policies are
uneven and bear little resemblance to any articulable food policy. That a
bill can be cobbled together from diverse interests by no means implies that
a deliberative consensus was reached; it simply means enough diverse
interests received sufficient benefit to tolerate the remaining portions of the
legislation. As Johnson and Monke noted, "[t]he omnibus nature of the bill
can create broad coalitions of support among sometimes conflicting
interests for policies that individually might not survive the legislative
process." 306
There is no suggestion that the campaigning and lobbying actions of
ADM or others described in the preceding paragraphs are illegal. The
ADM example, like countless more since, clarifies why democratically
preferred and public interested policies have proven unattainable:
legislators and other political actors are financially beholden to the very
interests they purport to regulate. When you combine the fact that both
major political parties suffer from this kind of financial dependence with
the pressure the two-party system puts on voters to maintain solidarity with
their parties to prevent a seemingly worse alternative from being elected,
any effective mobilization of the electorate around this issue is likely to
remain elusive. With respect to food policy, the public choice model and
median voter theories of politics are not operating in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
The combined direct and indirect costs of the corn subsidy are
astronomical. The average annual tax expenditures on corn supports is
nearly $5 billion for the past 16 years, with a total of over $77.1 billion.3 07
305. Atwell, supra note 168, at 17-18 (2007) (citing Forest Lee Andrews, Small
Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare to Take on the Fast Food Industry, 15 ALB. L.J. SCi. &
TECH. 153 (2004); Lorraine M. Buerger, The Safe Games Illinois Act: Can Curbs on
Violent Video Games Survive Constitutional Challenges?. 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617,
659-60 (2006); Jason A. Smith, Setting the Stage for Public Health: The Role of
Litigation in Controlling Obesity, 28 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 443, 452-54
(2006).
306. JOHNSON AND MONKE, supra note 45.
307. Farm Subsidy Database, supra note 128.
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A disproportionate share of that figure went to the largest commercial
producers308 and went on to subsidize a number of products of "dubious
social utility," including ethanol, high-fructose corn syrup, and
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO) animal products.3 09 The
Farm Bill as it currently exists also exacerbates America's epidemic of
diabetes, obesity, and coronary diseases, contributes massively to
healthcare costs, lost productivity, and other inefficiencies associated with
these conditions. The legislation also indirectly contributes to increases in
the price of fossil fuels, adds deferred costs in the form of a number of
irreversible environmental harms, including soil erosion, water pollution,
global warming, and the development of antibiotic resistant bacteria
associated with the CAFO farms that corn subsidization has rendered
profitable. The costs of this legislation also include the increased incidence
of starvation, immigration, and political instability that it promotes
internationally, all of which over time impose additional cost burdens on
U.S. taxpayers. The combined costs are massive.
The case for regulation here is far stronger than in areas where
(forgive the pun) the legislature has not already occupied the field. The
problem is not merely that the U.S. government should intervene in a failed
market to reduce the externalities or to stabilize commodity prices; the
problem is that the government actively funds the continuation of those
very same externalities it should be limiting while a handful of private
entities pocket the benefits of those public expenditures. As Mark Bittman
phrased it, "[t]he point is that this money, which is already in the budget,
could encourage the development of the kind of agriculture we need, one
that prioritizes caring for the land, the people who work it and the people
who need the real food that's grown on it,, 310
Because of the conflicts of interest at the core of our political
institutions, these near-universally reviled market distortions have become
entrenched and, practically speaking, have become part of the background
of the way things are. This state of affairs prompted Hanson, Benforando,
and Yousef to remark that, "policymakers tend to treat [subsidies] as part of
the unseen natural situation, and thus tend to be blind to their health effects
and, more specifically, their contribution to the obesity epidemic." 3 1' The
same could be said with respect to the environmental, socioeconomic, and
global labor and hunger crises that this legislation to some degree helps
308. Farm and Commodity Policy, supra note 295.
309. Philpott, supra note 139.
310. Bittman, supra note 228.




create. Commentators like Michael Pollan have expressed the somewhat
cynical hope that changes will come once the healthcare and insurance
industries start footing the bill for our failed food policies.3 12 But waiting
around for a problem to get worse so that corporate interests and public
concerns realign is hardly a solution. The perverse incentives perpetuated
by current commodity subsidy programs are perhaps all that can be
expected until Americans confront the structural problems and perverse
incentives that constitute the legislative process in the United States.
312. See Michael Pollan, How Change Is Going to Come in the Food System, THE
NATION, (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/163399/how-
change-going-come-food-system.
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